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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-A COMPARISON OF
WASHINGTON LAW AND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLE 3
BICHARD COSWAYO
The following article is the third in a series by Professor Richard
Cosway on negotiable instruments in which he compares existing
Washington law with Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Previous articles on Article 3 have appeared in 38 Wash. L. Rev.
501 (1963) and 38 Wash. L. Rev. 769 (1963).
Section 3-205. RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENTS. An indorse-
ment is restrictive which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any
bank," or like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collec-
tion; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser
or of another person.
Though the mere utterance of the words "conditional indorsement"
or "restrictive indorsement" strikes terror in most law students, there
has been surprisingly little litigation arising out of such indorsements.
Indeed, there is only one decision on the problem, and it will be dis-
cussed in connection with the succeeding section of the Code. The only
other authority is the Bank Collection Code which declares that certain
indorsements are restrictive.2 The classifications there stated are con-
sistent with this section, and with those U.C.C. sections which will sup-
plant the Bank Collection Code [4-201, 4-203, and 4-205 (2)].
Section 3-206. EFFECT OF RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT.
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negoti-
ation of the instrument.
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the de-
pository bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a
restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate
transferor or the person presenting for payment.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'Follett v. Clark, 19 Wn.2d 518, 143 P.2d 536 (1943), 19 WAsH. L. R v. 110 (1944).
2 WAiSH. REV. CoDE § 30.52.040 [Hereinafter cited as RCW].
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(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an in-
dorsement which is conditional or includes the words "for collection,"
"for deposit," "pay any bank," or like terms (subparagraphs (a)
and (c) of section 3-205) must pay or apply any value given by him
for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the indorse-
ment and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value.
In addition such transferee is a holder in due course if he otherwise
complies with the requirements of section 3-302 on what constitutes a
holder in due course.
(4) The first taker under an indorsement for the benefit of the
indorser or another person (subparagraph (d) of section 3-205) must
pay or apply any value given by him for or on the security of the
instrument consistently with the indorsement and to the extent that he
does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such taker is a
holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the requirements
of section 3-302 on what constitutes a holder in due course. A later
holder for value is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by such
restrictive indorsement unless he has knowledge that a fiduciary or
other person has negotiated the instrument in any transaction for his
own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty (subsection (2) of section
3-304).
Two provisions of the NIL' are generally thought to mean that per-
sons holding paper under restrictive indorsement are necessarily in the
same position vis-a-vis the obligor as the restrictive indorser. Such
holders are not due course holders. Follett v. Clark' is a startling illus-
tration. The payee of a note had indorsed it, "Pay to the order of
(Follett) for collection pursuant to the resolution of Trustees. .. "
Before Follett had collected, however, the payee, a bank, had been
dissolved. In a claim on the note subsequently pressed by Follett, he
was denied recovery because the payee (restrictive indorser) could not
have recovered after it had been dissolved.
The Code is much less explicit than the NIL, and in particular it does
not repeat the provision found controlling in the Follett decision.5 The
emphasis of the Code is in an entirely different place, since the interests
of the restrictive indorser or of the beneficiary of the restrictive in-
s RCW 62.01.037. [UNIFoRm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 37, hereinafter cited
NIL] and RCW 62.01.047 [NIL § 47].
419 Wn.2d 518, 143 P2d 536 (1943), 19 WAsH. L. REv. 110 (1944).
5 "A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right to bring any action
thereon that the indorser could bring... ." RCW 62.01.037.
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dorsemen 6 seem to be its sole concern. So long as these interests are
not impinged, the Code does not spell out the precise relationship
between the indorsee and the obligor, until the indorsee has paid value
consistently with the indorsement. That is to say, under the Code,
Follett would clearly be able to recover as a holder in due course if he
could show that he had in fact paid the payee for the note. Until this
payment, though, he would not take for value and thus would be subject
to defenses valid against the payee.' This is not the same thing, though,
as saying that his capacity to sue is identical to that of the restrictive
indorser, and this is in effect the rule of the Follett decision. The Code
seems to leave this aspect of the problem unprovided for, but one is
tempted to predict that with the loss of its underpinning' statute, the
Follett decision would not be followed. This unscientific hunch is sup-
ported by other decisions allowing assignees for collection to recover in
their own names, even though the assignor was literally disqualified
from suing on the assigned claim.'
The primary concern of the Code is to insure that in the most fre-
quent pattern involving restrictive indorsements, bank collection of in-
struments, the restrictive indorser may expect his bank to protect his
interests. He may not, however, expect other banks to look out for him,
for they may ignore the restrictive indorsement,9 and are bound only
by actual knowledge of some breach of duty. 0 Once the bank of deposit
has protected the restrictive indorser, as by crediting his account and
allowing withdrawal thereof in good faith, that bank is a due course
holder not subject to defenses assertable against the indorser.11 These
results were precluded by the NIL.
By a somewhat curious sequence of provisions, the Code first makes
the indorsement, "Pay A only" restrictive,1 2 and immediately recants
by providing that no restrictive indorsement prevents further negotia-
tion.1 8 However, this matter isnot vital because of its rarity1
Finally, by protecting and emphasizing only the rights of the benefi-
6 E.g., the indorsement "Pay A for collection, signed B" shows that B is retaining
an interest in the paper, but an indorsement "Pay A in trust for C, signed B" created a
beneficial interest in C, someone other than the restrictive indorser.7 UNUR COmMCIrAL CODE § 3-306, hereinafter cited by section.
s E.g., Marshall v. Pike, 145 Wash. 348, 260 Pac. 531 (1927).
9 Sections 3-206(2), 4-203, and 4-205(2). The effect of the indorsement "Pay any
bank, banker or trust company" is governed by § 4-201(2).
10 See § 3-304(2).
11 Sections 3-305, 4-208 and 4-209.
12 Section 3-205 (b).
Is Section 3-206(l) and Official Comment 2.
14 BAILEY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS, § 5.11 (3d ed. 1962).
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ciary under a restrictive indorsement, such as "Pay A in trust for B,
signed C," the Code suggests that A and any indorsee from him are not
necessarily subject to defenses good against C.11
Section 3-207. NEGOTIATION EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH IT
MAY BE RESCINDED. (1) Negotiation is effective to transfer the
instrument although the negotiation is
(a) made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or any
other person without capacity; or
(b) obtained by fraud, duress or mistake of any kind; or
(c) part of an illegal transaction; or
(d) made in breach of duty.
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such
negotiation is in an appropriate case subject to rescission, the decla-
ration of a constructive trust or any other remedy permitted by law.
Apart from the NIL provisions cited in the Official Comments as
precursors,16 there is no primary authority in Washington on the legal
issue here covered. It is most important, nonetheless, to emphasize just
what that legal issue is-the efficacy of a negotiation as transferring
title to the paper. Observe that the contractual liability of the negoti-
ating party (e.g., the minor indorser) is not covered by this section but
by another section of the Code.' 7
To an extent, this section merely continues the policy, generally rec-
ognized under the NIL, of denying to a person liable on an instrument
the defense that a former holder of the paper is a person having power
to disaffirm the transfer because of some incapacity or illegality. 8 As
to such obligor, the transfer whether voidable or not is effective. It is
the infant indorser, or the defrauded indorser, etc., who, having the
power to cancel the indorsement, may raise the issue of the existence of
this power.
The Code, however, is much more explicit than the NIL as to the
effect of a want of capacity (or any other objection to the transfer
listed in subsection (1)), particularly with respect to the holder in due
course. Strangely enough, though it is quite clear that the purchaser
15 The entire problem of the various forms of restrictive indorsements and their
effect is ably discussed in Comment, Restrictive Indorsements under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 24 U. PiTT. L. REv. 616 (1963).
16 RCW 62.01.022, 62.01.058, and 62.01.059 [NIL §§ 22, 58, and 59].
17 Section 3-305.
18 BRnnrON, BILLS AND NoTEs, § 160 (2d ed. 1961).
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of chattels sold by an infant gets a voidable title which will ripen into
a good title on resale to a bona fide purchaser, 9 there was substantial
pre-Code doubt whether the purchaser of a negotiable instrument from
an infant may, by negotiating to a due course holder, cut off the infant's
power to disaffirm the transfer.20 Under the Code, the outcome is clear
-whether voidable or void, the transfer is sufficiently effective to allow
a bona fide purchaser to cut off the transferor's rights to regain the
instrument. This is true even though that same transfer may not be
sufficient to create contractual liability on the transferor.2 On the
other hand, as to persons who are not holders in due course, the transfer
may be disaffirmed in an appropriate proceeding by the transferor, and
thus the paper may be repossessed by such party.
Section 3-208. REAQUISITION. Where an instrument is returned
to or reacquired by a prior party he may cancel any indorsement which
is not necessary to his title and reissue or further negotiate the in-
strument, but any intervening party is discharged as against the
reacquiring party and subsequent holders not in due course and if
his indorsement has been cancelled is discharged as against subse-
quent holders in due course as well.
Some, but by no means all, of the issues raised by reacquisition are
covered by this section. Specifically, it relates to the relative position
of the reacquirer (and those claiming through him in his capacity as
reacquirer) and persons who became liable on the instrument between
his first and second holding. The reacquirer has no claim against those
intervening parties, for as to him they are discharged. The reason as
stated in the official comment is that if the reacquirer were permitted
to assert a claim against intervening parties, for breach of warranty or
dishonor of the instrument, they would, in turn, claim against him for
the liability created by his previous transfer.22 However, the rule as
actually stated is broader than this, for it prevents assertion of a claim
by any reacquirer against any intervening party, even though there
may be no offsetting liability. For example, the holder may transfer
bearer paper without indorsing, or he may qualify his liability. This
results in a limited form of responsibility on the holder's part to subse-
'9 RCW 63.04250 [UNIFonR SA.Lns AcT § 24]. For the Code's equivalent in the law
of sales of goods, see § 2-403.
20 2 PATON'S DIGEST 2074 (4th ed. 1942).
21 See discussion of § 3-305 at note 153 infra, and Comment, Infants Contracts and
"17eir Enforcernent, 35 WASH. L. Rxv. 465, 469 (1960).2 2 Section 3-208, Official Comment.
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quent takers, but if he should reacquire from them, by an unqualified
indorsement, he is not in a position to enforce their liability on the
instrument."
The reacquirer may, as was true under the NIL, literally strike or
expunge the signatures of intervening parties. Such an act discharges
them even as against subsequent due course holders, but unless the
signatures are thus canceled, a due course holder may enforce the lia-
bility of the signers. The observable cancellation is sufficient to suggest
to the subsequent purchaser that the signer has been discharged.' It
must be observed, though, that the mere circumstance of reacquisition
does not put subsequent takers on notice of any defense or defect. Thus
subsequent takers may rely on all signatures on the paper, unless they
in fact know of the discharge.25
Consider the facts of First Nat'l Bank v. Harris.2" Initially, five
parties signed a note as co-makers, payable to X. Designating the
makers as A, B, C, D, and E, the problem can be posed by stating that
C, D, and E had signed for the accommodation of A and B. As among
these five parties, C, D, and E were sureties and A and B were princi-
pals. While we do not know exactly what occurred, we do know that X
indorsed the instrument. However, the plaintiff did not purchase the
instrument from X. Instead, he purchased it from A and B. The issue
was whether, in such circumstances, the plaintiff could enforce the lia-
bility of the sureties, C, D, and E. The court held that he could not,
because the fact that A and B (co-makers) were in possession of the
note with the payee's indorsement suggested payment. For this and
other reasons, the court announced a flat rule that a maker who comes
into possession of his paper may not reissue it so as to bind an accom-
modation party.
Observe that section 3-208 does not govern the outcome of the Harris
case, because C, D, and E were not intervening parties. Several Code
sections are involved," particularly section 3-602. The policy behind
the presently discussed section, 3-208, suggests, however, that unless it
appeared that the plaintiff knew of C, D, and E's status as accommoda-
tion parties, there is nothing about the apparent reacquistion of the
note which requires the conclusion that the note has been paid and
that it cannot be reissued.
23 BRiTroN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 323, 689-98.
24 Cf. § 3-602.
25 Sections 3-304(1) (b) and 3-602.
26 7 Wash. 139, 34 Pac. 466 (1893).
27 Sections 3-415, 3-601 (1) (d), 3-601 (3), 3-602, and 3-603.
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Turning to aspects of reacquisition which are not covered by the
present section, one may generalize that section 3-208 does not spell out
the relationship between the reacquirer and those who were liable to
him at the time he first held the paper. Usually, the arguments arising
between such persons involve the question of whether the reacquirer
can better the position he formerly held by claiming through an inter-
vening due course holder. Another Code section is quite explicit about
the circumstances under which a reacquirer may not make such a
claim.' Except as expressly provided therein, a reacquirer from a due
course holder may assert the rights of that holder.
A very common assumption is made that in any and all events the
reacquirer may at least reassume the rights he formerly had against
prior parties." The facts presented in one Washington case, First Na'l
Bank v. Dotson,3° show that such an assumption is not always valid.
There, the maker had been induced by fraud on the part of the payee to
sign a note. The payee had subsequently transferred by indorsement
to an accomplice (who, of course, was subject to the defense of fraud).
The accomplice then pledged the note with the plaintiff bank to secure
a legitimate indebtedness. At that point, then, the plaintiff became a
holder in due course to the extent of its lien, and to that extent would
be free of the defense of fraud. The plaintiff, though, returned the
instrument to the pledgor (the accomplice) who fruitlessly sought to
collect from the maker. On his failure to collect, the accomplice re-
turned the instrument to the plaintiff, but by this time the note had
matured and, if the circumstances at the time of this taking are deter-
minitive, the plaintiff cannot now be a holder in due course. Thus the
issue arises whether the plaintiff may reassert its former due course
holder status, and this, said the court, posed a factual question for the
jury. If the plaintiff merely delivered the instrument over to the
accomplice as an agent to proceed to collect, he had not lost his due
course holder rights. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff had surrendered
his lien at the time of this return, these lien rights are terminated and
cannot be reassumed.
The Code is not addressed to this particular problem, and no different
result is to be predicted under it. The issue, though, ought to be pin-
pointed to illustrate why this reacquisition is different from that visual-
28 Section 3-201.2 9 Dittmar v. Frye & Co., 200 Wash. 467, 93 P2d 717 (1939) ; Carr v. Bonthius, 79
Wash. 282, 140 Pac. 339 (1914)20 128 Wash. 450, 222 Pac. 886 (1924).
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ized by the presently discussed section. Section 3-200 speaks to the
situation in which a holder transfers the paper to a subsequent holder
and then retakes it from him. The facts of the Dotson case were that
the holder had returned it to a former holder and regained it from that
holder. These circumstances are ambiguous, because such a return may
manifest a surrender of rights on the paper. Retaking paper from sub-
sequent purchasers is not ambiguous in this sense for it does not suggest
any possibility of surrender of rights formerly held.
Section 3-301. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER. The holder of an in-
strument whether or not he is the owner may transfer or negotiate it
and, except as otherwise provided in Section 3-603 on payment or
satisfaction, discharge it or enforce payment in his own name.
This section of the Code does not substantially depart from previous
authority. It applies to any holder, and this means a person in posses-
sion of an instrument payable to him or his order, or indorsed to him
or his order, or payable to bearer."' He, in sum, is the person who
comes within the contracts stated on the instrument. That the holder
might not be the owner is illustrated by Stinson v. Sachs,2 where a
principal was permitted to recover on an instrument on which the
agent was the designated payee. In such a situation, if the agent was
in possession of the instrument, he would be the holder, and the princi-
pal would not. The major difference in the right to enforce the obliga-
tions on the paper is covered by section 3-307 and will be discussed in
conjunction with that section.
It has been held in Washington that the holder, as the term is here
used, may recover on paper consistently with the rules here stated. For
example, a married woman has been permitted to maintain an action
on paper payable to her, even though the note was actually community
property."8 A complaint need not allege that the plaintiff is the holder
where the note is set forth and the plaintiff is the named payee. 4 Other
illustrations are found below. 5
31 Section 1-201(20). Cf. RCW 62.01.191 [NIL § 191].
32 8 Wash. 391, 36 Pac. 287 (1894).
38 Nance v. Woods, 79 Wash. 188, 140 Pac. 323 (1914).34 Wockner v. King, 48 Wn2d 83, 291 P2d 649 (1955).
85 Croswaite v. Pierce, 56 Wn.2d 725, 355 P2d 160 (1960) (wife may not sue on
note executed by husband payable to a bank) ; Downie v. Cooledge, 48 Wn2d 485, 294
P2d 926 (1956) (indorsee under a qualified indorsement is the holder); West &
Wheeler v. Longtin, 118 Wash. 575, 204 Pac. 183 (1922) (check payable to broker as
earnest money may be enforced by him) ; Kilbourne v. Rathbun, 91 Wash. 121, 157 Pac.
457 (1916) (partner may recover on note in settlement of the partnership without an
accounting) ; Metzger v. Sigall, 83 Wash. 80, 145 Pac. 72 (1914) (payee of a note is
[VOL. 40 :281
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The rights stated in this section may, of course, be enjoyed by per-
sons who technically are not holders. An assignment for purposes of
bringing suit will, thus, enable the assignee to sue on the assigned note
in his own name." This principle can be extended, and an assignee
allowed to settle claims on such paper for less than the full amount."'
The Code covers such matters in section 3-201.
Section 3-302. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. (1) A holder in due
course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
(3) A holder does not become a holder in due course of an instru-
ment:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under legal
process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular
course of business of the transferor.
(4) A purchaser of a limited interest can be a holder in due course
only to the extent of the interest purchased.
The NIL's counterpart to this section 8 contains certain conditions
which are required of the paper in order to qualify its being held in due
course. Those requirements are:
(1) The paper must be regular on its face.
(2) The paper must be complete.
(3) The paper must not be overdue.
Subsection (1) of the Code's provision on due course holders does not
include these requirements, but it does substantially restate the condi-
the holder); Harris v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 291, 134 Pac. 1048 (1913) (payee is real
party in interest, even though he is to share proceeds with another) ; Jamieson & Mc-
Farland v. Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 Pac. 165 (1906) ; Davis v. Erickson, 3 Wash. 654,
29 Pac. 86 (1892).6 McfDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636,29 Pac. 209 (1892).
37 Anderson v. Anderson, 46 Wn2d 903, 280 P2d 252 (1955).
s8 RCW 62.01.052 [NIL §52].
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tions which must be fulfilled by a holder in order to qualify him as one
in due course. These are the requirements that he take for value, in
good faith, and without notice of previous dishonor, defenses, or title
claims against the paper. In addition, the three requirements stated
above are subsumed under notice, so that the issue is not whether
paper is regular, complete, or overdue, but whether the taker knows
this. This point is emphasized in sections 3-302 (1) (c) and 3-304.
The requirement that the holder take for value is refined in sections
3-303 and 4-209 and will be discussed under the former section.
"Good faith" is defined by the Code as "honesty in fact-in the con-
duct or transaction concerned." 9 At one time, the Code provided that
a holder in due course must take "in good faith including observance
of the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the
holder may be engaged." Because of criticism, generally centered on
the fear that this would require reasonable conduct on the part of the
taker, this provision was removed. 0 As the Code now reads, it does not
depart from the rules announced by the Washington court with respect
to good and bad faith." The test to be applied has been dubbed the
"blundering fool" or "white heart and empty head" doctrine." This
test is entirely subjective; did the taker act honestly? However, since
evidence on this matter will inevitably be circumstantial, the trier of
fact must keep in mind that he is trying to decide whether the taker did
in fact behave honestly. Presumably, the conduct of the taker may be
so gross that it is possible to conclude that no person could so act and
still be acting in good faith. Under such circumstances, we may con-
clude that the particular taker did not act in good faith. Illustrative of
this are purchasers who take at a discount. While mere purchase at a
39 Section 1-201(19).
40 See Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 431 (1954).
41 First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 148 Fed. 953 (9th Cir., 1906) ; Bowles v. Billik, 27
Wn.2d 629, 178 P.2d 954 (1947), 23 WAsH. L. REV. 74 (1948), which seems to adopt
the old requirement of due care, but the case is probably correct on its specific facts
and actually applies the good faith test; Yakima Fin. Corp. v. Mullins, 138 Wash. 553,
245 Pac. 5 (1926) ; Inland Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Cady, 138 Wash. 52, 244 Pac. 123
(1926); Baumeister, Vollmer & Scott Bank v. Talbott, 129 Wash. 509, 225 Pac. 238(1924); Lovell v. Dotson, 128 Wash. 669, 223 Pac. 1061 (1924) ; First Nat'l Bank v.
Gunning, 127 Wash. 307, 220 Pac. 793 (1923) ; Banner Meat Co. v. Rieger, 125 Wash.
142, 215 Pac. 334 (1923) ; First Natl Bank v. Wiltzius, 122 Wash. 637, 211 Pac. 275
(1922) ; Guaranty Sec. Co. v. Coad, 114 Wash. 156, 195 Pac. 22, 197 Pac. 326 (1921) ;
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpright, 93 Wash. 361, 160 Pac. 1046 (1916) ; Gibbens
v. Nipp, 80 Wash. 332, 141 Pac. 689 (1914) ; Barker v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac.
611 (1911) ; McNamara v. Jose, 28 Wash. 461, 68 Pac. 903 (1902) ; Hansen v. Hoff-
man, 5 Wash. 792, 32 Pac. 747 (1893).
42 Note, 4 BosToN COL. IND. & L. J. 452, 456 (1963).
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discount by itself may not equate with a failure to give value or a
taking in bad faith, 3 the amount of the discount, taken in context with
other facts, may lead to a finding of bad faith on the part of the dis-
counter." Another illustration can be found in the fine distinction
between failure to investigate carefully (which, of course, is not tanta-
mount to bad faith) and the apparent effort of a taker to close his eyes
to the obvious. This latter action is bad faith.'3 Bad faith is simply not
equatable to carelessness, however extreme, but it is equatable to
affirmative effort by a purchaser of an instrument to obviate the effect
of circumstances which are obvious to him.
A currently unsettled policy issue concerns the relative position of
consumers who have signed negotiable paper and those purchasers
(usually discounting finance companies or banks) who customarily
purchase this paper from the payee-supplier. While it is apparent that
a sham corporation set up to purchase paper from the purveyor of
goods or services will not quailfy as a due course holder,' it is much
less clear what circumstances will place an established discounter in
substantially the same position as a sham purchaser, that is to say, what
circumstances will show that such a purchaser is, in substance, the
payee. 7 The Code does not throw any more light on this difficult prob-
lem than did the NIL.
43 First Nat'l Bank v. Egbers, 130 Wash. 221, 226 Pac. 492 (1924) ; First Nat1 Bank
v. Gunning, 127 Wash. 307, 220 Pac. 793 (1923) ; Farmers' State Bank v. Betcher, 115
Wash. 327, 197 Pac. 15 (1921) ; Moore & Co. v. Burling, 93 Wash. 217, 160 Pac. 420(1916); Davis v. Hibbs, 73 Wash. 315, 131 Pac. 1135 (1913); Wells v. Duffy, 69 Wash.
310, 124 Pac. 907 (1912).
" Great W. Land & Improvement Co. v. Sandygren, 141 Wash. 451, 252 Pac. 123(1927); McNamara v. Jose, 28 Wash. 461, 68 Pac. 903 (1902).
Park v. Newell, 87 Wash. 431, 151 Pac. 783 (1915) ; Rohweder v. Titus, 85 Wash.
441, 148 Pac. 583 (1915). Scandinavian Am. Bank v. Johnston, 63 Wash. 187, 115 Pac.
102 (1911), has been criticized for its statement that "mere suspicion of an infirmity is
insufficient to put the indorsee upon inquiry or to show that he is not a holder in good
faith." It has been said that if this means that if the holder (purchaser) actually
suspected an infirmity and made no inquiry, it is erroneous. "Confusion often arises
from the fact that the distinction is not always clearly expressed, although probably
intended, between suspicious circumstances and a suspicious purchaser." BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE IxSTRUmZExTS LAw 775 (7th ed., Beutel 1948).
'
6 Marsol Credit Co. v. West Coast Grocery Co., 191 Wash. 134, 70 P2d 1046 (1937).
4T See J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn2d 481, 392 P.2d 214 (1964) ; Witen-
berg v. Sylvia, 35 Wn2d 626, 214 P2d 690 (1950) ; Allen v. Landre, 120 Wash. 171,
206 Pac. 845 (1922) ; Gwinn v. Ford, 91 Wash. 498, 158 Pac. 536 (1916), affirming 85
Wash. 571, 148 Pac. 891 (1915); Shedden v. Sylvester, 88 Wash. 348, 153 Pac. 1(1915) ; Washington Trust Co. v. Keyes, 79 Wash. 61, 139 Pac. 638 (1914) ; Allenberg
v. Wainwright, 62 Wash. 234, 113 Pac. 585 (1911). Cases in other jurisdictions are not
harmonious; see Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N. J. Super. 575 181 A.2d 809 (1962),
4 BosToN CoL. IxD. & Comm. L. J. 452 (1963); G. M. A. C. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72
So2d 319 (1954), 53 Mica. L. REv. 877 (1955) ; Implement Credit Co. v. Elsinger, 268
Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954); Note, Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course,
51 Ky. L.J. 134 (1962).
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The Code also fails to focus specifically on another aspect of the
problem. To what extent is a discounting purchaser a taker in bad
faith because he had previously purchased paper that arose from trans-
actions indistinguishable from the present one, and thus past transac-
tions had demonstrated fraud on the part of the payee or breaches of
contract by him?4" The Code's entire concern is with notice of defects
in the particular paper purchased, or in series instruments. It is difficult
to distinguish the blundering fool from the sharp operator, but at some
point the purchaser's familiarity with the operation of the payee and
the difficulties experienced with transactions represented by similar,
though unconnected, notes will surely constitute the basis for a finding
of bad faith or, in Code terms, rank dishonesty.
Recently, the Washington Legislature by enacting the retail instal-
ment sales statute addressed itself to the social and economic policy
issues involved here.4" This statute specifically invalidates any provi-
sion by which buyer agrees not to assert defenses or claims arising out
of the sale against the seller or seller's assignee."0 Thus, the policy is to
preserve consumer defenses even as against transferees of retail instal-
ment sales contracts. In one respect, however, this statute seems to
leave open the possibility of negotiable notes executed by a retail in-
stalment purchaser, since it allows transactions consisting of a note
secured by a mortgage." Inasmuch as this recital does not destroy
negotiability 2 and does not give notice of the mortgage," it would
appear that a holder in due course of such a note would be free of
defenses or claims assertable against the seller. In the more typical
conditional sales pattern, the conditional sales contract will embody all
of the terms of the contract, but this can not be equated with knowledge
that those terms have not been performed. Unless the conditional sales
contract is of such complexity as to be non-negotiable,54 due course
holders of this paper may also be free of defenses.
The substitution in subsection (1) (c) of the requirement that a
taker not know that paper is overdue for the NIL requirement that the
paper be not in fact overdue has been alluded to in the opening para-
4 8 The cases in note 47 supra are illustrative. Where a purchaser of a note was told
before he purchased that the maker would probably contest the note, he obviously
knows of sufficient suspicious circumstances to be precluded from thereafter taking in
good faith. Scandinavian Am. Bank v. Long, 75 Wash. 270, 134 Pac. 913 (1913).59 RCW 63.14.
50 RCW 63.14.150. [See § 9-206 and Comments].
51 RCW 63.14.020.
52 Section 3-112; Section 3-105.
51 Section 3-304(5).
54 Section 3-112.
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graph of this discussion, and will be discussed in connection with
section 3-304. At this point, however, it should be that paper with a
fixed maturity date seems to carry notice of maturity on its face. While
a purchaser may take the paper any time before this date, however near
to maturity, and be a due course holder, 11 he may not take the paper
after that date. 6
The nine words of sub-paragraph (2), stating that a payee may be
a holder in due course, will end a much discussed problem. Prior to
adoption of this Code provision, there were substantial obstacles to any
holding which permitted a person designated as payee of an instrument
to be a due course holder, even though he was completely insulated
from any participation in or knowledge of a defense. The Washington
court espoused the approach that the payee may not be a due course
holder,17 except where the paper was originally purchased by a remit-
ter"8 or was payable on its face to joint payees and indorsed by one over
to the other. 9 The Code makes these distinctions unnecessary.
Subsection (3) enumerates particular situations in which a holder of
paper ought to stand in the shoes of his transferor." While one may
take paper in payment of or as security for an antecedent debt and be
a due course holder,"1 he may not become a due course holder by
acquiring the paper through legal process designed to collect that debt.
Subsection (4) is merely the articulation of a general rule which is
most frequently applied under section 3-201(2). It states that a pur-
chaser of only a limited interest is a holder in due course only to the
extent of the interest purchased.62
65 Washington Nat'l Bank v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491, 33 Pac. 972 (1893).56 See Higgins v. Radach, 12 Wn2d 628, 123 P2d 352 (1942) ; Morisse v. Salveson,
165 Wash. 157, 4 P.2d 852 (1931); Burtt v. Schoening, 138 Wash. 187, 244 Pac. 381(1926); Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509 (1909) (in
terms of dishonor). Gordon v. Decker, 19 Wash. 188, 52 Pac. 856 (1898) ; Murray v.
Reed, 17 Wash. 1, 48 Pac. 343 (1897). That one many take after dishonor, but without
notice thereof, and be a due course holder, see Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash.
8, 216 Pac. 862 (1923).
57 Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash. 8,216 Pac. 862 (1923),; Bowles v. Clark,
59 Wash. 336, 109 Pac. 812 (1910), overruled, Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash.
417,289 Pac. 47 (1930).58 Kohler v. First Natl Bank, supra note 57.59 State Bank v. Pacific Grain Co., 125 Wash. 149, 215 Pac. 350 (1923).
60 In accord and illustrative is Shuey v. Holmes, 20 Wash. 13, 54 Pac. 540 (1898)
(bank receiver stands in the position of the bank).
61 Section 3-303. The security holder is a holder for value only to the extent of the
indebtedness. Section 3-201. Thus parol may be used to show that a particular in-
strument, though indorsed in blank, was transferred only for security. Keeler v. Com-
mercial Printing Co., 16 Wash. 526, 48 Pac. 239 (1897). If there is no defense, the
holder recovers the full amount of the instrument. Hillman v. Stanley, 56 Wash. 320,
105 Pac. 816 (1909).
62 Cf. Hillman v. Stanley, 56 Wash. 320, 105 Pac. 816 (1909) where there was no de-
fense to the paper, thus the holder recovered in full even though he held as pledgee only.
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Once the position of due course holder has been attained, this status
should not be lost by subsequent events. Thus, if a holder has pur-
chased paper without knowledge of existing defects, he will be able to
preserve his due course status even though he subsequently learns of
the defects. A Washington case which contains contrary dicta should
not be followed."8 The Code, though, seems to contain one departure
from this rule when it deals with a reacquirer who, as former holder, at
any time had knowledge of a defense." This provision may be read as
depriving this particular reacquirer of his due course holder status.
Section 3-303. TAKING FOR VALUE. A holder takes the instru-
ment for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed
or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instru-
ment otherwise than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an
antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is
due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrev-
ocable commitment to a third person.
The concept of "bona fide purchaser for value" or "holder in due
course" seems to be founded on fundamental principles of fairness so
as to protect one who, acting innocently on an apparent state of facts,
has so changed his position by an outlay of money, property, or effort
that it is unjust to defeat his expectation. This policy, when taken as a
starting point for a discussion of value, has resulted in the need for
distinguishing between value and consideration in two important con-
texts. The first concerns promises, and the second deals with past
consideration. Both situations are covered by this section of the Code.
If some outlay which will result in loss upon failure of the payor's
expectation is the test for value, it is at once apparent that a person
who has merely promised performance and not yet performed can not
63 American Nat'!l Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 132 Wash. 490, 232 Pac. 295
(1925). Cf. Union Inv. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 79 Wash. 112, 139 Pac. 874 (1914) ; Amer-
ican Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911), aff'd, 67
Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26 (1912) (Addition of words "without recourse" after notes have
been acquired does not let in defenses. Paranthentically, the presence of those words in
the original indorsement would not deprive the holder of due course status. RCW
62.01.038 [NIL § 38]. The Code does not explicitly cover this point.)
See also Broadway Bank v. Whittaker, 177 Wash. 62, 30 P2d 993 (1934) (the status
of a holder in due course of a note pledged as security is not altered by the fact that a
partial payment and renewal note are taken on the secured note).
"Section 3-201 (1).
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usually be a taker for value. This person can prevent loss by the simple
expedient of not performing his own promise. While he loses the per-
formance which he expected, this is not the sort of loss which is equat-
able to a change of position on his part. Thus, section 3-303 (a) takes
as its departure the position that performance, not the promise thereof,
is typically the giving of value. The concept of promise as consideration
in bilateral contracts is inapplicable to questions of value, insofar -as
bona fide purchases and due course holding are concerned.
This concept has had its most frequent application where credit has
been given by a bank on the basis of a check, note, or draft. The
authorities do not agree on this question,"8 but the dominant view is
that the giving of credit is not the giving of value.6 While the Code
retains this position, one exception is made. Where credit is "available
for withdrawal as of right," it constitutes the giving of value."' Some
Washington decisions seem to apply this exception to the ordinary bank
deposit situation," even though a right of charge-back existed, and the
Code is, in the writer's opinion, not explicit regarding the circumstances
which will result in a credit "available for withdrawal as of right."
But it is believed that the existence of the ordinary bank deposit, with
a right of charge-back on failure to collect, will not constitute the bank
a holder for value. 9
The creation of an irrevocable credit would be treated differently
from ordinary credits. Merely creating such credit would be the giving
of value, since the obligation must be performed irrespective of lack or
failure of consideration. This situation not only falls precisely within
the provisions of article 40 but it is also within the ambit of paragraph
(c) of section 3-303. Thus, a bank, certifying a check or issuing its own
negotiable draft, takes for value when it creates the obligation and not
when it performs.71 Because a bank may not avoid its obligation as
against a due course holder, it is in precisely the same position as it
would have been in, had it paid in the first place.
" BITTON, BILLs AND NOTES § 97 [2d ed. 1961).66 It is at once apparent that a bank which takes an instrument for collection, even
though provisional credit is given, is not a holder for value within this rule. Spokane
State Bank v. Pitner, 114 Wash. 177, 194 Pac. 969 (1921) so holds. There is, however,
a potentially misleading statement in McDaniel v. Pressler & Anderson, 3 Wash. 636,
29 Pac. 209 (1892) that, "[A]n assignment for purpose of collection is an assignment
for a valuable consideration." This sentence is obiter, and ought not be followed.67 Section 4-208(1) (b). See also § 4-209.6 8 National Bank of the Republic v. Hines, 112 Wash. 352, 192 Pac. 899 (1920);
Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869 (1920).
69 See BAILEY, LAW OF BAxN CHECKs § 4.6 (3d ed. 1962).70 Sections 4-208 and 4-209.T1Acme Fin. Co. v. Zapife, 161 Wash. 312,296 Pac. 1050 (1931).
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Another area in which efforts to equate value and consideration fre-
quently occur is in respect to the antecedent debt problem. It is ar-
guable that a person taking an instrument or property as payment of
an antecedent debt does not take for value, since by a reinstatement
of the debt he can be restored to his previous position just as the per-
son who has merely promised to perform may protect himself by not
performing."2 There are areas of law where this argument is accepted,
i.e. doctrines relating to purchasers of trust property sold in breach of
trust."' However, the Code, fully consistent with previous uniform
statutes, 4 takes a contrary approach. An antecedent debt is value,
whether an instrument is taken in payment of or as security for such
a debt. There is no immediately apparent reason why an antecedent
debt must be a debt of the transferor of the paper, and a Washington
decision which seems to require this is suspect. 5 In order to be consist-
ent with cases in which consideration was in issue, contrary holdings
can be anticipated."
Once a position has been taken with respect to the types of problems
just discussed, it becomes necessary to evolve a rule which will cover
the situation where a part of the promised price has been paid. The
Code rule, consistent with previous authority," is that value has been
given only to the extent that one has performed, and a person becomes
7 2 Long v. McAvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 233 Pac. 930 (1935).
73 Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn.2d 740, 150 P2d 604 (1944).7 4 RCW 62.01.025 [NIL § 25]; RCW 63.04.755 [UNiFopm SALES ACT § 76]; Love-
ring v. Pacific Fruit Package Co., 162 Wash. 445, 298 Pac. 693 (1931) ; German-
American Bank v. Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769 (1915) ; American Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 53, 116 Pac. 837 (1911), aff'd, 67 Wash. 572, 122 Pac.
26 (1912).
7 Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137, 238 Pac. 918 (1925). To be
distinguished is S. R. McGowan Co. v. Carlson, 79 Wash. 92, 139 Pac. 869 (1914),
where the seller of stock in taking a note for the price, had the note made payable to
a corporation. Since the corporation had parted with nothing, it was not a holder for
value.7 6 E.g., Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209 Pac. 521 (1922), 32 YALE
L. J. 405 (1922) ; Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 37 Wash. 18, 79 Pac. 470 (1905).
See § 3-408.
77 Crewdson v. Shultz, 254 Fed. 24 (9th Cir., 1918) ; John Davis & Co. v. Bedgisoff,
155 Wash. 127, 283 Pac. 665 (1930) ; Brokaw v Kunze, 127 Wash. 593, 221 Pac. 590
(1923) ; Hallock v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 110 Wash. 385, 188 Pac. 479 (1920) ;
Old Nat'l Bank v. Gibson, 105 Wash. 578, 179 Pac. 177 (1919), 17 MicHi. L. REv.
703 (1919), 20 COLUm. L. REv. 351 (1920); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpright,
93 Wash. 361, 160 Pac. 1046 (1916); German-American Bank v. Wright, 85 Wash.
460, 148 Pac. 768 (1915) ; Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911) ; Com-
mercial Bank v. Toklas, 21 Wash. 36, 56 Pac. 927 (1899). Contra, American Say.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dennis, 90 Wash. 547, 156 Pac. 559 (1916), which was over-
ruled in Old Nat'l Bank v. Gibson, supra. A caveat is in order concerning the Gibson
decision, since one of the texts in the field of negotiable instruments cites it as adop-
ting the rule that the giving of credit is the giving of value. Ogden, NEGOTIALE
INSTRUMENTS 287 (5th ed. 1947). The decision does not support such a statement.
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a holder for value, free of equities and defenses, only to the extent
of that performance."8 Because it is practically impossible to allocate
withdrawals to a particular deposit in the case of bank credits, resort
to a fiction is made by the Code. This fiction is the First Money In-
First Money Out (FIFO) theory. 9
Section 3-304. NOTICE TO PURCHASER. (1) The purchaser
has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of
forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into
question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambigu-
ity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is void-
able in whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when
he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in
payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his
own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has
reason to know
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is
an uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same
series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been
made or more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A
reasonable time for a check drawn and payable within the states
and territories of the United States and the District of Columbia
is presumed to be thirty days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the pur-
chaser notice of a defense or claim.
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
78 To be distinguished, of course, is the purchase at a discount. If the full price
agreed upon is paid, even though it is a discounted price and thus less than the face
value of the note, the purchaser is a due course holder (at least insofar as value is
concerned) and may recover the face amount. First Nat'l Bank v. Egbers, 130 Wash.
221, 226 Pac. 492 (1924); Williams v. Duke, 125 Wash. 250, 215 Pac. 372 (1923);
Moore & Co. v. Burling, 93 Wash. 217, 160 Pac. 420 (1916) ; McNamara v. Jose, 28
Wash. 461, 68 Pac. 196 (1902).79 Section 4-208(2).
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(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory prom-
ise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser
has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms
thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the
purchaser has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the in-
strument, or in payment of any other instrument, except one of
the same series.
(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute
notice within the provisions of the Article to a person who would other-
wise be a holder in due course.
(6) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such
manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
The concept of "notice" is legally significant in a multitude of ways
and in many areas of law. When dealing with commercial paper, there
seem to be two facets of notice to consider. It must first be considered
what evidence is relevant in determining what an actor knew. (Note
that we are concerned with actual knowledge-not that of a reasonably
prudent man). What the actor in fact knew may remain a secret, but
we discern what he probably knew by discovering that information
which was readily available to him." At this point, the second and more
difficult element of notice arises. Notice is more complicated than simple
awareness, since one may not fully appreciate those facts of which he is
aware. "' He may be expected to evaluate these facts, to draw inference
from them, and, if you please, to read between the lines. The precise
problem in formulating a substantive test for "notice" or "knowledge"
seems to be how much information is the taker of a negotiable in-
strument expected to derive from between the lines?
Section 3-304 states rules of law which, where applicable, require or
8 0 In the field of criminal law, the problem is well illustrated by comparing State
v. Hunter, 11 Wn.2d 282, 118 P.2d 947 (1941) with State v. Rubenstein, 69 Wash. 38,
124 Pac. 135 (1912). The trier of facts is permitted to infer that a particular person
knew those things which a reasonable man in his position would know. However, this
may not be solidified into a rule of law that conclusively presumes that a particular
person does know everything that a reasonably prudent person would know. Such a
conclusive presumption would equate knowledge with due care in finding out.
81 A reader may know a meaning for every word used in TENNYSON'S IDYLS OF THE
KiNG, for example, and yet not appreciate the hanky panky going on between Lancelot
and Guinivere, let alone the mysteries of the Holy Grail.
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forbid as a matter of law a determination that the actor had notice of a
critical circumstance merely because he had knowledge of some other
closely related circumstance. However, this section must be read to-
gether with two or three other extremely important provisions of the
Code.82 In these other sections, awareness of facts is treated as "actual
knowledge" of those facts, but notice of facts is broader and includes
the inferences one may be expected to derive from apprehended facts."
The preceding sentence is somewhat ambiguous. It might have been
worded, "but notice of facts is broader and includes inferences one may
be expected to derive reasonably from apprehended facts" or even more
pointedly, "notice includes the inferences a reasonably prudent man
would draw from observed facts." Though such statements would re-
move some ambiguity, it is believed that they would not be warranted
by the Code. While some doubt has developed as to whether due care
or reasonably prudent conduct is to be the criterion for due course
holding, it seems unwarranted. The present version of the Code has
been considered by some to be sufficiently obscure on the effect of a
lack of due care that the following additional amendment is warranted:
In any event, to constitute a notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser
must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. If the
82 Of particular importance are §§ 1-201(25), 1-201(26), 1-201(27), and the com-
ments thereto. These provisions are of such significance with regard to the notice
requirement that they are set out at this point.
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he
has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it.
"Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar import refers to knowledge rather
than to reason to know. The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification
may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act.(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or
not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification
when (a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract was
made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such
communications.(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is
effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention
of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time when it
would have been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.
An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for com-
municating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is
reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual
acting for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is
part of his regular duties or unless he has reason to know of the transaction and that
the transaction would be materially affected by the information.
8s See §1-201(25) (c), supra note 82.
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purchaser is an organization and maintains within the organization rea-
sonable routines for communicating significant information to the appro-
priate part of the organization apparently concerned, the individual
conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser must have knowl-
edge.84
An earlier version of the Code had incorporated into the good faith
requirement a prescription requiring that reasonable commercial stand-
ards be observed. Fear that this embodied the rejected rule requiring
reasonable care accounts for its removal from the present version.
There seems no basis for apprehension that the Code requires rea-
sonably prudent conduct" including investigation in the first instance.
It is only after a purchaser has received information about some facts
that any issue is raised as to a duty to inquire. Even at this point, the
Code provides that a taker will have notice only when, from all facts
and circumstances he (not a reasonably prudent person) had reason to
know that a specific fact existed."
The word "suspicion" crops up in many discussions of the problem
of notice, and has been troublesome because the word has many shades
of meaning." One frequently reads that a ground for suspicion is not
notice. No fault can be found with this statement if it means that a
particular holder is not bound to investigate those details which might
appear suspicious to a reasonable man. 5 One is certainly not obligated
to refute remote possibilities for which, while they might be true, there
is no specific suggestion in particular facts." On the other hand, once
a prospective purchaser knows certain facts which carry an overpow-
8 4 Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enact-
ient of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 CoLum. L. Rav. 992, 999 (1962).
85 But see Leary, Article 3: Commercial Paper, UNIFORm COmmERCIAL CODE HAND-
BOOK, 110 (1964), where an objective standard is foreseen. For prior law, see Scandina-
vian Am. Bank v. Johnson, 63 Wash. 187, 115 Pac. 102 (1911). As Leary has observed,
questions of notice become almost indistinguishable from those of good faith, and thus
the discussion and cases cited in connection with section 3-302 are relevant. That sep-
arate issues are involved, though, is demonstrated in Great W. Land & Improvement
Co. v. Sandygren, 141 Wash. 451, 252 Pac. 123 (1927). Failure to use due care is not,
historically, tantamount either to bad faith or knowledge obtainable by its exercise.
Gray v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 578, 104 Pac. 828 (1909).
86 Cf. Leary, supra note 85.
8T Zuckerman, Negotiable Instruments-Purchaser in Good Faith, 10 W. Ras. L.
Rv. 177 (1959).8 Kohndtz v. Jansen, 130 Wash. 308, 226 Pac. 1023 (1924) ; Keith v. Tsue Chong,
119 Wash. 507, 205 Pac. 834 (1922).
89Baumeister, Vollmer & Scott Bank v. Talbott, 129 Wash. 509, 225 Pac. 238 (1924);
Farmers State Bank v. Betcher, 115 Wash. 327, 197 Pac. 15 (1921) ; Barker v. Sartori,
66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac. 611 (1911).
90 In every case there is a possibility of fraud or breach of contract. Business prac-
tices in some operations are perhaps a little more dubious than in others. Still one must
not assume that every transaction by every business man in that field is tainted with
fraud. Until some particular facts about the transaction of which the instrument in
question are known to a prospective taker, he may assume the legitimacy of the tran-
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ering implication that a defense exists, he may not close his eyes to this
implication." Indeed, such an inference need not be overpowering,
since enough is shown to constitute notice if the facts actually known
make the existence of a defense or claim probable."2 In a sense, the pur-
chaser of an instrument is on "'constructive" notice insofar as he is
required to draw inferences from facts which he knows. However, he
is not otherwise subject to losing his status as a due course holder by
constructive notice.9
To any extent that knowledge or notice is measured subjectively,
there arises a field of inquiry as to whether information which had been
known at one time, still existed in the mind of a purchaser at the time
of purchase."' The Code specifically disclaims any position on this
issue, 5 and no directly relevant Washington decision has been found,
although the matter seems to have been adverted to." At the other end
of the chronological spectrum is the obvious rule that knowledge ob-
tained after an instrument has been acquired is not relevant to the
status of due course holder," except in particular circumstances.
saction. This may be broadened to include knowledge of defects in related or closely
similar transactions by the same parties, but it surely goes no farther. See Larsen v.
Betcher, 114 Wash. 247, 195 Pac. 27 (1921), where the court epitomizes one party's
contention as being that no one can purchase a note given for the price of stock in good
faith.9 1 BrroN, op. cit. supra note 65, § 112.
02 The distinction again is between "suspicious circumstances" and a "suspicious
purchaser." See note 45 supra, and Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn2d 740, 150 P2d 604
(1944).
93 Section 3-304(5) is founded on this principle.
o4 It might be argued that once knowledge is shown to have been possessed by a
particular person he is never afterwards free of such knowledge. This is analyzed in
GANvmILE W~miAms, Cpam-L LAw § 63 (2d ed. 1961).
95 Section 1-201(25).96In Gibbens v. Nipp, 80 Wash. 332, 141 Pac. 689 (1914), the court seems to con-
clude that information received by a purchaser considerably prior to the purchase does
not preclude due course holding, since such information would not make much impres-
sion on her so long as she was not then contemplating purchase. See BniTwoN, op. cit.
supra note 65, § 107.
07 Keith v. Tsue Chong, 119 Wash. 507, 205 Pac. 824 (1922).
08 In § 3-303, knowledge is relevant although acquired after purchase where it is
acquired prior to performance of an executory promise. In § 3-201, dealing with the
rights of reacquirers, notice of a defense or claim is mentioned, but it is not clear when
this notice must have been possessed in order to be relevant. Sections 3-415(3) and
3-606 raise problems of whether notice that a signer is in fact an accommodation party
requires a holder to recognize and guard against defenses characteristic of that capacity.
Obviously, notice for this purpose might be significant even if acquired after an instru-
ment is purchased but prior to the omission regarded as a defense to the accommodating
party.
This note is not intended to be exhaustive of situations wherein knowledge or notice
acquired subsequent to purchase are legally important, except insofar as the status vel
non of due course holder is involved. Thus, by way of illustration, the sections on
warranty which speak of knowledge of defenses are beyond the scope of this note,
though they do refer to knowledge possessed by a holder as of the time he transfers,
not as of the time he receives, the instrument. Sections 3-417 and 4-207.
The usual situation, where notice comes into existence after the acquisition and is
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The first three subsections of section 3-304 spell out typical fact pat-
terns which provide the basis for finding notice of defenses, claims
against, or maturity of the instrument. Since notice of any of these
circumstances precludes due course holding," this section is obviously
designed to elaborate the broader and undefined requirements posed in
the definition of a holder in due course. Subparagraph (1) (a) restates
in terms of notice categorical requirement of the NIL that an in-
strument be both complete and regular.' ° It has been doubted whether
this Code statement is an improvement;' 0 ' essentially the same factual
questions remain to be solved. For example, it has been held, that a
note is negotiable, for a sum certain, and complete and regular, even
though the sum to be paid appears only in numbers in the margin or at
the head, and is omitted from the blank space left for the number of
dollars, in the body of the note.0 2 One would predict that the Code
would reach an identical result; indeed it seems an a fortiori conclusion.
The contribution of the Code may be limited to converting what was an
absolute requirement under the NIL into a requirement that is permis-
sive of minor irregularities and omissions which do not suggest basic
invalidity. Other illustrations of unusual remarks or omissions culled
from Washington decisions appear in a note.'08 It may be generalized
from these illustrations that one may not ignore extraneous remarks
appearing on negotiable instruments, but in each case the effect of such
remarks is to be determined by the notice they give to the purchaser.
therefore irrelevant to due course holding, is illustrated by Jamieson & McFarland v.
Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 Pac. 165 (1906).
o9 Section 3-302(1) (c).100 RCW 62.01.052 (1) [NIL § 52(1)].
101 STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAx NwoCrIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND THE UNFORm
COMMERCIAL CODE 64 (1960).
102 Citizens Bank v. Jones, 127 Wash. 294, 220 Pac. 787 (1923), 22 MxcH. L. Rxv.
607 (1924).10 Doub v. Rawson, 142 Wash. 190, 242 Pac. 920 (1927) (fact that a non-negotiable
sales contract was payable at a finance company was not notice to the buyer that it
would be assigned to that finance company); Baumeister, Vollmer & Scott Bank v.
Talbott, 129 Wash. 509, 225 Pac. 238 (1924) (fact that the number "8," specifying the
amount of interest, and the words "at maturity" were in different handwriting from
the balance of the note was not material and did not preclude due course holding) ;
Mills v. Hayden, 128 Wash. 67, 221 Pac. 994 (1924), (notations on a number of
checks, payable to A, that they were "For F. Burdick, picker," etc. did not preclude
the plaintiff, who took the check through A's indorsement, from becoming a due
course holder). First Nat'l Bank v. Sullivan, 66 Wash. 375, 119 Pac. 820 (1911) is
interesting for the COurt did not discuss the effect of some rather substantial oms-
sions from the body of the note.
Cf. Hughes & Co. v. Flint, 61 Wash. 460, 112 Pac. 633 (1911), discussed in connec-
tion with § 3-105, 38 WAsr. L. REv. 501, 511 (1963).
The most significant case dealing with incomplete paper in Washington is United
Ry. & Logging Supply Co. v. Siberian Commercial Co., 117 Wash. 347, 201 Pac. 21(1921), 22 COLum. L. REv. 159 (1922), 70 U. PA. L. REv. 232 (1922), and previously
discussed in connection with § 3-109, 38 WAsH. L. REv. 501, 522 (1963).
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One item which should be noted is the difference between purchase of
an instrument containing blanks at the time of the purchase and pur-
chase of complete paper which has, to the knowledge of the purchaser,
been previously completed by someone other than the issuer. Under the
NIL, some doubt existed as to the effect of filling blanks in the presence
of a purchaser of an instrument."°  The purchaser may not know of
limitation of authority which has been exceeded by the person filling
the blanks, and therefore, he should be considered a due course holder.
Even though a purchaser of a note sees someone other than the maker
complete the instrument, he may recover on the instrument as com-
pleted. This situation is covered by the specific provisions of section
3-304 (4) (d), and also appears to be the Washington rule under the
NIL."' Such a determination is consistent with other Washington deci-
sions which state that a purchaser may assume honest conduct on the
part of prior parties unless he has knowledge to the contrary."' It
should be observed that section 3-304 is so worded as to also govern the
rights of holders.
A related problem is presented when a drawee pays an instrument
which, to his knowledge, has been completed by one other than the
drawer. Consistent with the provision under discussion, the Code would
also protect a drawee who pays in such circumstances, absent notice
that the completion was not proper. 07 Alteration of an instrument is
treated somewhat differently than completion. The Code provides that
a purchaser has notice of a defense if the instrument "bears such visible
evidence of... alteration.., as to call into question its validity .... ,0o
This suggests that alterations of substantial import (amount, name of
the payee, etc.) which are made in obvious ways (different colored ink
or in different handwriting, etc.) may not be assumed to have been made
prior to the original issue of the instrument or with the consent of the
maker. While this matter will be discussed below,"0 9 it should be ob-
1o BRToN, op. cit. 4upra note 65, at 199.
1O5Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash. 8,216 Pac. 862 (1923), permitted recov-
ery by the plaintiff who had seen blank checks filled in by one other than the maker,
Because of the then Washington rule that a payee may not be a due course holder, the
plaintiff's recovery was based on an estoppel.
In a comparable situation, where blanks had been filled in such a way as to indicate
that they were not filled in at the time of the original issue, a purchaser was held to be
a due course holder. Baumeister, Vollmer & Scott Bank v. Talbott, 129 Wash. 509, 225
Pac. 238 (1924).2o0 Brokaw v. Kunze, 127 Wash. 593, 221 Pac. 590 (1923) (the fact that a bank
took bearer bands to secure a husbands debt knowing that the wife had purchased
them with separate property does not preclude holding in due course); First Nat'l
Bank v. Guardian Trust & Say. Bank, 117 Wash. 231, 200 Pac. 1095 (1921).
107 Section 4-401(2) (b).
108 Subsection (1) (a) of § 3-304. 109 See discussion under §6 3-307 and 3-407.
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served here that only those alterations which raise questions as to the
essential validity of the instrument are significant.110
Subsection (1) (b), dealing with the voidability of obligations, is sup-
plemented by the provision of section 3-302, which states that a holder
in due course must take without notice of any defense. Subsection (1)
(b) is not exhaustive,"' and the Official Comment's reference to set-off
and counterclaim" 2 has been criticized."' This matter will be discussed
in connection with the sections describing the rights of holders."' The
idea that a person who has notice of a defense is subject to that defense
is so obvious that it scarcely needs stating. It has been illustrated by
Washington decisions dealing with such matters as usury,"' mistake," 6
failure of consideration,".7 and the related defense that the instrument
is affected by gambling,"' non-compliance with conditions precedent"'
or other conditions, 20 and the most frequently appearing defense
(judged by reported cases), fraud.' With respect to fraud and mis-
representation, the case of Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Romano Eng.
Corp."' warrants reconsideration. The facts suggest that a bank had
purchased paper, knowing that the payee had made representations to
110 Washington law appears to be in accord with this approach, even under the NIL.
Thus, in Chamberlain v. Geer, 135 Wash. 340, 237 Pac. 719 (1925) the court had before
it an instrument where the date was in a different ink from the balance. One cannot say
that this was a clearly obvious alteration, for there was no clear evidence of erasure.
One might, therefore, analogize this case to the Baumeister case, supra note 104 and
permit recovery according to the instrument as it appears at the time of trial. It was
not necessary to decide this, though, for recovery "according to the original tenor" was
adequate protection to the plaintiff. On the issue of due course holding, the court
emphasized that the appearance of the paper was not such as to arouse suspicion or to
put a reasonable person on inquiry. Thus the requirement of regularity was transmuted
into one of knowledge derived from irregularity.
I'l Braucher, UCC Article 3- Comnercial Paper-New York Variations, 17
RuTGERs L. Rav. 57, 68 (1962).
112 Comment 3.
11s Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49
Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 436 (1954).
114 Sections 3-305 and 3-306.
1"5 Fry v. Knouse, 142 Wash. 500, 253 Pac. 802 (1927).
116 Naylor v. Lovell, 109 Wash. 409, 186 Pac. 855 (1920).
117 Hamilton v. Mihills, 92 Wash. 675, 159 Pac. 887 (1916) ; Hamilton v. Ramage,
89 Wash. 649, 155 Pac. 151 (1916) ; Johnson County Say. Bank v. Rapp, 47 Wash. 30,
91 Pac. 382 (1907).
118 Ash v. Clark, 32 Wash. 390, 73 Pac. 351 (1903). To the same effect is RCW
4.24.090.
319 Merrill v. Muzzy, 11 Wash. 16, 39 Pac. 277 (1895).
120 Yakima Fin. Corp. v. Mullins, 138 Wash. 553, 245 Pac. 5 (1926).
121 Bowles v. Billik, 27 Wn2d 629, 178 P2d 954 (1947), 23 WASir. L. RFv. 74
(1948); Marsol Credit Co. v. West Coast Grocery Co., 191 Wash. 134, 70 P2d 1046
(1937) ; Inland Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Cady, 138 Wash. 52, 24 Pac. 123 (1926) ; First
Nat'l Bank v. Wiltzius, 122 Wash. 637, 211 Pac. 275 (1922); Gwinn v. Ford, 85 Wash.
571, 148 Pac. 891, aff'd, 91 Wash. 498, 158 Pac. 536 (1916); Union Inv. Co. v. Rosen-
zweig, 79 Wash. 112, 139 Pac. 874 (1914).
122 188 Wash. 290, 62 P2d 445 (1936), aff'd on rehearing, 65 P.2d 688 (1937), 12
WAsH. L. Rv. 81 (1937), 37 CoLum. L. Ray. 852 (1937).
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the maker. Those statements or representations were, in fact, false, and
the court held (in a divided opinion) that the bank was subject to the
defense of fraud. This decision would seem erroneous unless the bank
knew that the representations were false. Absent such knowledge or
notice, the holding is inconsistent with the philosophy of either the NIL
or Code. In fact, it is contrary in principle to a specific Code provi-
sion 23
The Code's elimination of constructive notice through filing 2' was
previously discussed. However, there is a related problem of what
might be called "imputed notice," worthy of mention at this point. The
circumstances presenting this problem usually involve corporate
activities of considerable size, where one employee may know facts not
known to others. Under what circumstances is an employee's knowledge
also the knowledge of the employer? The question is most easily an-
swered negatively, and in the following circumstances knowledge is not
imputed to the principal: (1) Where the agent is acting adversely to
the principal's interest; 2 (2) Where it appears that the agent obtained
the knowledge while clearly in some capacity other than as represent-
ative of the principal, particularly where the agent's interests are
adverse to the principal; 2 and (3) Knowledge which was casually
obtained under circumstances where the significance of that knowledge
as affecting the rights of the principal is not obvious. 2 ' On the other
hand, knowledge of an agent, certainly one who is under duty to for-
ward such information to his principal, 2 ' received in the course of his
agency will be imputed to the principal. 9 The Code adds a detail of
great significance by providing a guideline for determining when an
organization receives effective notice.m 8 Notice (both in the sense of the
notice received from notification and in the sense of necessary fact
inferences from known facts) and knowledge of tke particular employee
handling the transaction are made determinative by this section, (so
long as the organization has used reasonable care in passing along in-
formation received.)
223 Subsection 4(b) of § 3-304.
12- Subsection 5 of § 3-304.
12 5 RESTATEMNT, AGENCY (2d) § 282 (1958) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Yaldma First
Natfl Bank, 179 Wash. 615, 38 P.2d 384 (1934) ; Fry v. Knouse, 142 Wash. 500, 253
Pac. 802 (1927); German-American State Bank v. Soap Lake Salts Remedy Co., 77
Wash. 332,137 Pac. 461 (1914).
2
28 Hoppe v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Wash. 41, 241 Pac. 662 (1925).
127 Washington Natfl Bank v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491, 33 Pac. 972 (1893) ; cf. RES'ATE-
MMNT AGENCY (2d) § 276 (1958).
128 RESTATEMET AGENCY (2d) § 272 (1958).
129 Hitt Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian Am. Bank, 114 Wash. 167, 195 Pac. 13, 196
Pac. 629 (1921). 130 Section 1-201 (27).
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Another area of inquiry concerns the effects of notice or knowledge
which does not emanate from the particular transaction or instrument,
but instead is derived from similar or related transactions. Though
the Code seems to be worded in terms of notice or knowledge of defects
in, defenses to, or claims on the particular instrument, it is believed
that notice of a defense or claim can be found when there exists a
knowledge of defenses or claims arising out of connected or quite sim-
ilar transactions. Where a bank purchases all notes that are given by
customers to a jewelry salesman and the first 99 had been found to have
been fraudulently obtained by the salesman, it is suggested that the
bank is not a bona fide purchaser without notice of fraud on the pur-
chase of the 100th note, if such note was also affected by fraud.' "' Thus,
we have one mechanism that may be used to preclude financing op-
erators from becoming holders in due course, a matter on which the
Code is strangely silent."' In this regard, it should be noted that some-
times a "purchaser" of an instrument will, in fact, be so closely con-
nected with the seller-payee of the instrument so as to be subject to
defenses that are good against the payee 8 even though this purchaser
had no positive evidence or knowledge of these defenses.
Subsection (2) deals with instruments negotiated by fiduciaries. At
the very outset, it merits notice that the Washington legislature had seen
fit to add a unique provision to the NIL that covers this fiduciary prob-
lem. 134 Two major differences exist between the Code's provision and
that of the Washington statute. First, the Code governs negotiations
by fiduciaries but not fiduciarily drawn paper, while the Washington
statute governs both. Second, the Washington statute has adopted a
policy protecting those persons who deal with fiduciaries which is much
broader than that provided by the Code. Under both Code and statute
provisions, the knowledge that a fiduciary is negotiating paper does not
prevent due course holding,"' but the knowledge of a purchaser that
a fiduciary is violating his duty will subject the purchaser to this breach
of duty.' The Code precludes due course holding whenever the pur-
chaser is aware only that the transferor is using the instrument to pay
his own private debt or for his own benefit. While some early Washing-
131 See Johnson County Say. Bank v. Rapp, 47 Wash. 30, 91 Pac. 382 (1907).
132 Note, Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course, 51 Ky. L.J. 134 (1962).1 3 3 Marsol Credit Co. v. West Coast Grocery Co., 191 Wash. 134, 70 P2d 1046
(1937).
134 RCW 62.01.0195.
'15 Section 3-304(4) (e). Hill Syrup Co. v. American Say. Bank & Trust Co., 133
Wash. 501, 234 Pac. 11 (1925).
186 Pitzen v. Doubleday, 5 Wn.7d 370, 105 P2d 726 (1940).
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ton decisions had adopted this rule,." the NIL amendment rejected
it 88 On balance, it would seem that the Code rule is preferable, since
it is sufficiently unusual for an agent or fiduciary to pay his own debts
by indorsing his principal's checks that this act can be equated to notice
that something is amiss.' 9
Subsection (3) implements the section 3-302 requirement that a due
course holder take without notice that paper is overdue. Instruments
having a fixed maturity date will carry notice on their face, and no
purchaser can take as a due course holder after the disclosed date.14
Instalment notes come within this subsection so that under the Code
one is precluded from becoming a due course holder if he takes with
knowledge that an instalment has not been paid. However, a point of
distinction is to be observed with regard to the instalment note. Be-
cause notes can be expected to circulate until the maturity of the
final instalment, there may be due course holders, insofar as unpaid
instalments are concerned, prior to final maturity, even though earlier
instalments have in fact matured. What inferences must a purchaser
draw when an instalment note is tendered to him after one or more
137 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 86 Fed. 541 (9th Cir. 1898) ;
Rensselaer Valve Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 129 Wash. 253, 244 Pac. 673(1924) ; Hoffman v. Gottstein Inv. Co., 101 Wash. 428, 172 Pac. 573 (1918).
138 RCW 62.01.0195 (1955) Signature by agent, autzority, notice of limitations.
Where a check or other negotiable instrument is drawn, made or indorsed in the name of
or for a corporation, firm, association, estate or person hereinafter called principal by an
officer, trustee, attorney or other agent or fiduciary, hereinafter called agent, to the
personal order of such agent as payee or indorsee or to the order of a bank in which
such agent keeps a personal account or to the order of any third person neither the fact
that such check or other negotiable instrument is so drawn or indorsed, or is paid by
the drawee, or is deposited in the personal account of such agent or is given by him or
its proceeds used in payment of his private debt to the bank in which deposited or to
any other person or is negotiated by him in any personal transaction shall singly or
collectively be sufficient to put the depositary or drawee bank or any other person, bank,
firm or corporation upon inquiry as to the authority of such agent or constitute notice
of an infirmity in the check or other negotiable instrument or defect in the title of the
agent, in the absence of actual knowledge upon the part of such bank or person that
such check or other negotiable instrument was drawn, indorsed, negotiated, deposited
or paid without the authority of the principal.
The leading decision is General Cas. Co. v. Seattle-First Nat~l Bank, 42 Wn.2d 433,
256 P.2d 287 (1953). See also Rice v. Peoples Say. Bank, 140 Wash. 20, 247 Pac. 1009(1926); Hill Syrup Co. v. American Say. Bank & Trust Co., 133 Wash. 501, 234 Pac.
11 (1925) ; Harden v. State Bank, 118 Wash. 234, 203 Pac. 16 (1922) ; Island Belt &
S. S. Co. v. J. & M. Cafe, 103 Wash. 263, 174 Pac. 19 (1918) ; Fisk Rubber Co. v.
Pinkey, 100 Wash. 220, 170 Pac. 581 (1918) ; National City Bank v- Shelton Elec. Co.,
96 Wash. 74, 164 Pac. 933 (1917) ; Barker v. Pfund, 80 Wash. 143, 141 Pac. 327 (1914);
Mott Iron Works v. Metropolitan Bank, 78 Wash. 294, 139 Pac. 36 (1914) ; Spencer v.
Alki Point Transp. Co, 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509 (1909); Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Palmer, 22 Wash. 473, 61 Pac. 158 (1900),13D This has been the view under the UmNiFoa Fmucnms AcT, §§ 4 and 6.
140 Britton, supra note 113, at 424; 72 BANKIG L. J. 305, 311 (1955). See Gordon
v. Decker, 19 Wash. 188, 52 Pac. 856 (1898) for the Washington rule, in accord.
It is to be noted that the NIL's presumption that indorsements were prior to matu-
rity, relied on in Myers-Shepley Co. v. Milwaukee Grain Elevator Co., 124 Wash. 583,
214 Pac. 1051 (1923) is not retained by the Code.
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instalment dates have arrived? May he assume that they have been
paid on time, or must he assume that they have not? Is inquiry re-
quired? Absent a custom he knows or should know, it is believed that
the purchaser may assume that the instalments were paid when due,
and thus become a due course holder of the unpaid instalment. How-
ever, where the custom is to indorse on notes any evidence of partial
or instalment payments, the purchaser runs the substantial risk of being
denied the status of a due course holder because the absence of an in-
dorsement of payment may be construed as notice that no payment was
made.1"' Certainly in such a situation, the purchaser cannot claim that
he thought no payments were made and thus seek to be a holder in due
course even as to overdue instalments."4 2
In the preceding discussion of the nonpayment of instalments, it is
important to observe that the instalments referred to are instalments
of principal. It is settled by both the Code4 . and pre-Code litigation"
that nonpayment of interest, even if known to a purchaser, will not
suggest a defense by the obligor to the principal sum, and a due course
holding status is, therefore, not precluded.
Where nonpayment of interest occurs in a note having an acceleration
clause which permits the advancing of maturity of nonpayment, it can
be predicted that if the acceleration clause is worded in such a way as to
appear automatic, i.e. on nonpayment of any instalment of principal or
interest the whole sum shall be due, then a purchaser who knows of the
occurrence of the accelerating event is not a holder in due course. 4 '
On the other hand, if the provision is worded in terms of giving an
option to the holder to accelerate, (i.e. on nonpayment of interest, the
holder may declare this note due) one may purchase with knowledge
that the accelerating event has occurred and still be a due course holder,
unless he knows that the maker had exercised the option.
Where a series of notes are involved, the Code provides that if one
note has been defaulted and the purchaser is aware of this, then the
141 Cf. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1976 (1942).
1 42 BrrroN, BILLs AND NoTEs 274 (2d ed. 1961).
143 Section 3-304(4) (f).
144 Britton, op. cit. supra note 142, at 276.
The Washington court has, however, occasionally suggested that nonpayment of in-
terest, known to a taker, is a factor to be considered on the issue of good faith. Shultz
v. Crewdson, 95 Wash. 266, 163 Pac. 734 (1917) ; Ireland v. Scharpenberg, 54 Wash.
558, 103 Pac. 801 (1909). The Code rejects this rule, returning to the rule initially
adopted in Washington. Spencer v. AlI Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509
(1909).
145 The existing authority in Washington, though, is contrary, because of the con-
struction given to acceleration clauses. Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., .upra note
144. See the discussion in connection with § 3-109, 38 WASH. L. Rav. 501, 519 (1963).
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purchaser cannot be a due course holder of any of the notes in the
series.'46 It is believed that a purchase of only those notes in the series
which have not matured will not insulate a purchaser from the effect of
maturity of one or more. The purchaser can not be a holder in due
course of any, so long as he has reason to know that he is purchasing a
part of a series and that there has been default of one of the notes.
This accords with the holding in one interesting Washington case 47
Demand instruments are governed by a rule all their own, since they
are "due" when issued and thus arguably "overdue" an instant later.
By Code 4' and previous legal provisions,1 49 such treatment of demand
of paper is not the case. One may purchase demand paper within a
reasonable time after issue and without knowledge of a previous de-
mand, if there was one, and still be a due course holder. The major
contribution of the Code in this matter is its statutory edict that a
reasonable time for a domestic check is presumed to be thirty days.
Prior law has been most uncertain 50 in determining reasonable time,
and under the Code there will remain a question of fact in any case
other than the domestic check.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that most of the details
of subsection (4) are correlative to other specific provisions. No partic-
ular Washington authority exists with respect to the particulars con-
tained in this subsection as to those matters discussed above. The
Washington decisions are entirely in accord with subsection (4) (b),1 6'
and subsection (4) (c).112 Both subsections (5) and (6) are new.
146 The Washington decisions are not clear on the point, perhaps because the facts
do not always distinguish between notes in a series and notes of the same maker, other-
wise unconnected. The Code, it is to be remembered, distinguishes the two by §§ (3) (a)
and 4(f) of § 3-304. See Guaranty Sec. Co. v. Goad, 114 Wash. 156, 195 Pac. 22, 197
Pac. 326 (1921) ; Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509 (1909).147 Keene v. Behan, 40 Wash. 505, 82 Pac. 884 (1905).
148 Section 3-304(3) (c).
14 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1978 (1942) ; RCW 62.01.053 [NIL § 53].150 The decision in German-American Bank v. Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769
(1915) seems to have confused two principles, (a) the one here involved with respect
to due course holding, and (b) the effect of delay in presentment on the liability of
secondary parties. The time limits applicable for these two principles are not neces-
sarily the same, though as it happens the Code's provisions are identical, insofar as the
thirty-day time limit on the liability of drawers is concerned. Cf. §§ 3-304(3) (c),
3-503(2).
1 1 First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 148 Fed. 953 (9th Cir., 1906) ; Garner v. F. T. Crowe
& Co., 138 Wash. 584, 244 Pac. 970 (1926) ; Cross v. Voss, 132 Wash. 576, 231 Pac. 929(1925) ; Lovell v. Dotson, 128 Wash. 669, 223 Pac. 1061 (1924) ; Citizens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Limpright, 93 Wash. 361, 160 Pac. 1046 (1916); German-American Bank v.
Wright, sutpra note 150; Washington Trust Co. v. Keyes, 79 Wash. 61, 139 Pac. 638(1914) ; Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911); Gross v. Bennington, 52
Wash. 417, 100 Pac. 846 (1909).
152 O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P.2d 641 (1933) ; Bank of Cal. v. Starrett,
10 Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410 (1920), 90 CENT. L. J. 394 (1920).
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Section 3-305. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. To
the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument
free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of anyperson; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract;
and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction,
as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the in-
strument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument.
This section considers the rights of the due course holder with respect
to both ownership claims against the document and liability for contrac-
tual defenses. While the holder in due course was free from third party
claims to the instrument under pre-Code law,15 the availability of de-
fenses against such a holder depended upon whether the defense was
([real" or "personal." The fundamental choice in classifying between
these two groups of defenses depended upon a policy choice, whether
the protection of the obligor was more important than maintenance of
a free flow of instruments by virtue of negotiability.
It is to be observed that the Code treats claims different from
defenses. An illustration is the indorsement of an instrument by
an infant which, though there seem to be no pre-Code Washington
cases,1 54 under the Code will (a) permit an infant to avoid contractual
liability to the extent that he may do so on a simple contract, and yet
(b) not enable him to recover the instrument from a transferee.55
15s Thus, theft of bearer instruments gives rise to a right of the victim to recover
the stolen instrument, but this right is not effective against a due course holder. Hellar
v. National City Co., 171 Wash. 585, 18 P2d 480 (1933); Bank of Cal. v. National
City Co., 138 Wash. 517, 244 Pac. 690 (1926), modified, 141 Wash. 243, 251 Pac. 561
(1926), 25 MIcH. L. REv. 794 (1927) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Palmer, 22 Wash. 473,
61 Pac. 158 (1900). An innocent transferee of notes takes free of a claim of a receiver
or trustee in bankruptcy of the transferor that the notes were transferred in a fraud-
ulent conveyance. McNamara v. Farnsworth, 106 Wash. 523, 180 Pac. 466 (1919).
1.54 See Comment, Infants' Contracts and Their Enforcement, 35 WASH. L. Ray. 465
(1960).
155 Section 3-207.
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Thus, an infant's claim to the instrument, which is based upon his power
to rescind the transfer, is cut off, but his defense to liability may be
retained.
With respect to other forms of incapacity, essentially the same di-
chotomy exists, and the availability of the defense is predicated on
whether the incapacity is such as to make the obligation void.'56
The effect of duress under the Code will depend upon the degree of
threats or force used.' The Washington cases do not provide authority
sustaining this distinction,5 8 but the posture of the cases has not been
such as to present the issue.
Similarly, the Code distinguishes between fraud which vitiates the
contract entirely, and fraud which, because it does not go to the nature
of the contract but to its inducement, makes the contract voidable. This
distinction has been recognized in Washington, where the holdings are
consistent that fraud in factum"9 (which makes the contract void and
a nullity, a "real' defense) is to be distinguished from fraud in the
inducement.'
Illegality, too, may be a real or personal defense, depending on the
strength of the policy by which an instrument is declared illegal. Since
'18 Competence is usually equated to ability to manage ones own affairs, or transact
business. Peoples State Bank v. Driscoll, 143 Wash. 401, 255 Pac. 134 (1927) ; Ameri-
can Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Peterson, 112 Wash. 101, 191 Pac. 837 (1920) ; Bell v.
Waudby, 4 Wash. 743, 31 Pac. 18 (1892). Intoxication is a defense as against a non-
due-course-holder. Gibson v. Feeney, 66 Wash. 531, 120 Pac. 97 (1912). It is arguable
that intoxication can become so disabling as to constitute a real defense. BwRAmxA,
Nmor iAmLE INSntrUMNTs LAw 758 (7th ed., Beutel ed. 1948).
There is no longer any presumed incompetence of women by reason of marriage.
Churchill v. Miller, 90 Wash. 694, 156 Pac. 851 (1916) ; Northern Bank & Trust Co.
v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328 (1914).
The Washington decisions respecting ultra vires acts of corporations have involved
WAsH. CoNST., art. XII, § 6 forbidding execution of money obligation instruments
otherwise than for consideration received. The rule in Washington is that a written
obligation in violation of this provision is not enforceable by a non-due-course-holder,
but is enforceable by a holder in due course who does not know that the obligation of
the corporation is merely an accommodation. O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24
P.2d 641 (1933) ; Bradley Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170
(1910) ; Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509 (1909).
157 Official Comment 6.
258 Bair v. Spokane Say. Bank, 186 Wash. 472, 58 P2d 819 (1936) ; Walcott v.
Wood, 109 Wash. 617, 187 Pac. 375 (1920); Cornwall v. Anderson, 85 Wash. 369, 148
Pac. 1 (1915) ; Delta County Bank v. McGranahan, 37 Wash. 307, 79 Pac. 796 (1905).
159 Yaima Valley Bank v. McAllister, 37 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 1119 (1905). Cf.
Gibson v. Feeney, 66 Wash. 531, 120 Pac. 97 (1912) (suggesting that one may deny the
execution of a contract and at the same time assert that the contract was procured by
fraud).
260 Miller v. Williamson, 128 Wash. 124,222 Pac. 201 (1924) ; Lovell v. Dotson, 128
Wash. 669, 223 Pac. 1061 (1924) ; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209
Pac. 521 (1922), 32 YALE L J. 405 (1923) ; Jamieson & McFarland v. Heim, 43 Wash.
153, 86 Pac. 165 (1906). Of course, the maker cannot defend on the ground that he
signed in order to defraud a third person. Silvain v. Tabusa, 122 Wash. 443, 210 Pac.
782 (1922).
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the policy is usually articulated by legislation, in a provision making
non-complying instruments void, 6' absence of such a provision usually
results in illegality being only a personal defense."0 2
Subsection (2) (d) adds a detail which is not covered by pre-Code
law, and it establishes the real defense effect of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. 8 Discharges other than insolvency proceedings are personal.'"
A caveat seems in order respecting this section, for one must not read
it as exclusive. With respect to the defenses of which a holder in due
course is freed, it merely states the most general of principles, and detail
is left to other Code sections." 5 The listing of real defenses even omits
the traditionally real defenses of forgery 66 and material alteration.'67
161 Thus, in Gray v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 578, 104 Pac. 828 (1909), a due course holder
was permitted to recover on an instrument which violated an anti-rebate statute, because
that statute did not declare the instrument void. Probably the clearest statement of the
effect of the statute is in Barker v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac. 611 (1911), but the
dictum in Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931),
19 CALIF. L. REv. 544 and the decision in Main v. Johnson, 7 Wash. 321, 35 Pac. 67
(1893) illustrate the Washington rule.
162 Ile gambling transaction is the clearest example. RCW 424.090 protects hold-
ers in due course, even though as between the parties an instrument is said to be "void
and of no effect." Ash v. Clark, 32 Wash. 390, 73 Pac. 351 (1903).
Usury, a matter on which there is great variation in state policy, has been held to be
a personal defense in Washington. Harder v. McKinney, 187 Wash. 457, 60 P.2d 84(1936); Acme Fin. Co. v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312, 296 Pac. 1050 (1931); American Say.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911), aff'd, 67 Wash. 572,
122 Pac. 26 (1912); Fenby v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 127, 101 Pac. 492 (1909); Grubb v.
Stewart, 47 Wash. 103, 91 Pac. 562 (1907) ; Keene v. Behan, 40 Wash. 505, 82 Pac. 884(1905) ; McDaniel v. Pressler & Anderson, 3 Wash. 636, 29 Pac. 209 (1892).
In other areas of illegal contracts, language that an obligation is "void as against
public policy" must be taken in context, for the language appears in cases where due
course holders were not involved. A due course holder might recover on such an instru-
ment even in the face of such strong language. Doonan v. Rossi, 112 Wash. 150, 191
Pac. 865 (1920); Skagit State Bank v. Moody, 86 Wash. 286, 150 Pac. 425 (1915);
Manson v. Hunt, 82 Wash. 291, 144 Pac. 45 (1914).
163 The only Washington decision discovered is Delta County Bank v. McGranahan,
37 Wash. 307, 79 Pac. 796 (1905), which upheld the discharge as against the payee of
a note. Some of the language in that decision, respecting the effect of a discharge order,
is questionable. See Gollehon v. Gollehon, 178 Wash. 372, 34 P.2d 1113 (1934) for a
more accurate statement.
164 Sections 3-305(2) (e) and 3-602.
165 E.g., §§ 3-115 [nondelivery of incomplete paper] ; 3-119 [effect of collateral
writings] ; 3-306 [a tabulation of personal defenses] ; 3-407 [alteration] ; 3-408 [want or
failure of consideration] ; 3-415 [accommodation signatures] ; part 5 of Art. 3 [con-
ditions precedent to liability of secondary parties] ; and part 6 of Art. 3 [discharge].
With the exception of the change worked by § 3-115, availability of defenses against
due course holders has not been altered by the Code. Illustrative (but not exhaustive)
decisions are: Lee v. Swanson, 190 Wash. 580, 69 P2d 824 (1937) (presumption of
delivery) ; National Fin. Co. v. Emerson, 117 Wash. 297, 201 Pac. 4 (1921) (failure
of consideration is personal defense) ; Angus v. Downs, 85 Wash. 75, 147 Pac. 630
(1915) (nondelivery by the maker is personal defense) ; German-American Bank v.
Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769 (1915) (conditional delivery is personal defense) ;
Bradley Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170 (1910) (absence of
consideration is personal defense) ; Lodge v. Lewis, 32 Wash. 191, 72 Pac. 1009 (1903)
(delivery presumed).
166 That it is a "real" defense, see § 3-404. On the related question of whether a
drawee may charge a drawer's account on a forged instrument, see § 4-401.
167 Alteration is governed by §§ 3-407 and 4-401.
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Availability of set-off and counterclaim is not articulated, though it may
be assumed that, as under present law,"'8 a holder in due course is
insulated from this169
Perhaps the most serious gap at this point in the Code concerns the
position of the holder in due course with respect to security given for
an obligation which is represented by a negotiable note. With respect
to chattel mortgages, Washington has protected the holder in due course
in foreclosure as extensively as he would be protected in an action on
the note."' This protection seems destined to continue under the
Code, 71 and indeed will be extended to other types of chattel security,
such as the traditional conditional sale.Y2
Section 3-306. RIGHTS OF ONE NOT HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE. Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any per-
son takes the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action
on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance
of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special
purpose (Section 3-408); and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the in-
strument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to
such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive
indorsement. The claim of any third person to the instrument is
not otherwise available as a defense to any party liable thereon
unless the third person himself defends the action for such party.
Subsection (a) seeks to clarify a point upon which there was a
fundamental difference of opinion under prior law. The rule of this
subdivision is that any person other than a due course holder, or one
168 RCW 4.32.110; Williams v. Duke, 125 Wash. 250, 215 Pac. 372 (1923) ; Bowen
v. Rury, 117 Wash. 30, 200 Pac. 789 (1921). In Wilson v. Pearce, 57 Wn2d 44, 355
P.2d 154 (1960), on the other hand, it was held that a non-due-course-holder is subject
to a set off for damages due because of the payee's fraud.
169 See Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law zth Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial
Code, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 417, 436-37 (1954) ; 72 BAKXING L. J. 381, 382-83 (1955).
170 See Shattucl, Secured Transactions (Other 7tan Real Estate Mortgages)-A
Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9,
29 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 37 (1954) and Peters v. Gay, 9 Wash. 383, 37 Pac 325 (1894).
171 Bautista & Kennedy, The Imputed Negotiability of Security Interests under the
Code, 38 IND. L.J. 574, 599 (1963).
172 Section 9-206.
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claiming through a due course holder, takes the paper subject to
equitable title claims of third persons. Incidentally, it goes without
saying, that such a person is subject to legal defects in title, such as
those caused by forged indorsements necessary to the title of the claim-
ant."' However, in one situation, involving the effect of maturity, the
courts have disagreed." 4 The Washington court's approach was that
if an instrument had matured, a subsequent taker would ask, '"Why
was this not paid?", thereby causing a taker to be subject to the maker's
defenses, yet not subject to a third party's rights.7 5 The rationale for
this approach was that the nonpayment suggested that the maker had
a reason not to pay, but did not necessarily suggest that someone other
than the maker had a claim to the instrument.'76 The Code rejects this
dichotomy and subjects the post-maturity taker' to third party claims
as well as to a maker's defenses. However, at least one writer has
questioned whether the Code will be entirely effective on this point.'
There seems to be little doubt that any non-due-course-holder takes
negotiable paper subject to the same defenses that were good against
his transferor; 7 9 thus, subdivision (b) does not change prior law.'8
373 The very language of subdivision (a) encompasses this, but in addition, one
ought to recall that often the rights of parties to negotiable instruments depend upon
their being holders. If a necessary indorsement is forged or missing, the person in
possession of the paper is not the holder as defined in § 1-201 (20).
1 Harden v. State Bank, 118 Wash. 234,203 Pac. 16 (1922).
'75 Reardan v. Cockrell, 54 Wash. 400, 103 Pac. 457 (1909).
176Se Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HALv. L. REv. 1104 (1918).
'" More accurately, of course, it is not a question of maturity but of knowledge of
maturity under § 3-302.
.78 Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 U. C i. L. REv. 469, 481 (1963).
l17 There is always the possibility, however, that one may be precluded, as by estop-
pel, from asserting a defense. One may, for example, by making representations that
no defense exists be precluded from denying those representations as against one who
purchased in reliance thereon. The Old Nat'l Bank v. Exchange Natl Bank, 50 Wash.
418, 97 Pac. 462 (1908). Conduct on the part of an obligor may be such as to suggest
that there is, in fact, no defense and that the claimed defense is spurious. Schields v.
Schorno, 51 Wn.2d 737, 321 P.2d 905 (1958) (payment after knowledge of defenses
waives them). Indeed, the total fact pattern is important in determining whether the
asserted defense exists, because the business acumen of an obligor may be such as to
belie a claimed lack of understanding of the transaction. Mason v. Burnett, 126 Wash.
498, 218 Pac. 255 (1923) ; Warnock v. Itawis, 38 Wash. 144, 80 Pac. 297 (1905). Since
the availability of a defense is to protect from harm, if the harm has been compensated
the defense is done away with. Thus, where a maker of a note has been compensated by
the payee for the fraud perpetrated by the payee, the maker will be liable on the note
to the holder, even if he does not have due course status. Nissen v. Obde, 58 Wn.2d
638, 364 P.2d 513 (1961).
Sometimes, the receipt of benefit by a defendant will nullify a defense, i.e., an ultra
vires transaction. Weber v. Spokane Nat'l Bank, 64 Fed. 208, (9th Cir, 1894); United
States v. Brooks, 28 Fed. Supp. 712 (WD. Wash. 1939); Flanagan v. American Min-
erals Prod. Co. 108 Wash. 569, 185 Pac. 609 (1909); Allen v. Olympia Light &
Power Co., 13 Wash. 307, 43 Pac. 44 (1895); Tootle v. First Nat'l Bank, 6 Wash.
181, 33 Pac. 345 (1893).
180 Miller v. Myers, 158 Wash. 643, 291 Pac. 1115 (1930) (one in pari delicto to a
[VoL. 40:281
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ARTICLE 3
Though no specific reference is made to the availability of set-off, the
Code produces no change from the view that this remedy is available
against non-holders-in-due-course to the same extent that it is available
against an assignee. 81
Subsection (c) emphasizes' specific personal defenses which have
been recognized under pre-Code law. 82 The greatest difficulty promises
to be presented by the provisions which deal with the availability of
conditions and delivery for only limited purposesi 82 Problems will
arise, as they did under law prior to the Code, respecting the effect of
the parol evidence rule. By providing that a non-due-course-holder is
subject to the defense of non performance of any condition'precedent,
the Code continues the previous rule that those conditions may be
asserted even by parol.'8 ' No change is suggested in the theory that
transaction void against public policy may not enforce notes incident thereto) ; Shuey
v. Holmes, 20 Wash. 13, 54 Pac. 540 (1898).
Thus fraud in the inducement is a defense to a claim by one who does not claim
through due course holding status. Shields v. Schorno, 51 Wn2d 737, 321 P.2d 905(1958) (fraud not shown); Lially v. Johnson, 187 Wash. 511, 60 P2d 249 (1936)
fraud not shown); Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Anderson, 186 Wash. 226, 57 P.2d
1046, (1936), 106 A.L.R. 166 (non-negotiable instrument); Community State Bank v.
Day, 126 Wash. 687, 219 Pac. 43 (1923) ; Horowitz v. Kuehl 117 Wash. 16, 200 Pac.'
570 (1921); Hamilton v. Mihils 92 Wash. 675, 159 Pac. 887 (1916) ; Gwinn v. Ford,
91 Wash. 498, 158 Pac. 536 (1916), afrming 85 Wash. 571, 148 Pac. 891 (1915);
Fourier v. American Life &Acc. Ins. Co., 74 Wash. 175, 133 Pac. 9 (1913) ; Aurora
Land Co. v. Keevan, 67 Wash. 305, 121 Pac. 49 (1912); Hynes v. Plastono, 45 Wash.
190, 87 Pac. 1127 (1906); Daniel v. Gldden, 38 Wash. 556, 80 Pac. 811 (1905);
Hanson v. Tompkins, 2 Wash. 508, 27 Pac. 73 (1891). Duress is similarly treated.
Bair v. Spokane Say. Bank, 186 Wash. 472, 58 P2d 819 (1936); Delta County Bank
v. McGmnahan, 37 Wash. 307,79 Pac. 796 (1905).
Illegality, though not described as vitiating entirely a note or check, may constitute
a personal defense. Anderson v. Hoard, 63 Wn.2d 290, 387 P2d 73 (1963) (usury is a
defense on a non-negotiable instrument assigned to the plaintiff) ; Lewer v. Cornelius,
72 Wash. 124, 129 Pac. 911 (1913) ; Keene v. Behan, 40 Wash. 505, 82 Pac. 884 (1905)(usury) ; Ash v. Clark, 32 Wash. 390, 73 Pac. 351 (1903) (gambling debts).
181 RCW 4.08.080; Adams v. Spokane Drug Co., 57 Fed. 888 (E.D. Wash. 1893);
Wilson v. Pearce, 57 Wn2d 44, 355 P2d 154 (1960) ; Johnson v. City of Aberdeen,
147 Wash. 482, 266 Pac. 707 (1928); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Eagon, 122
Wash. 586, 211 Pac. 278 (1922) ; For discussion, see Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Shuf-
feldt, 87 Fed. 669 (9th Cir., 1898) ; Williams v. Duke, 125 Wash. 250, 215 Pac. 372
(1923).
182 Failure of consideration or want of consideration: Spahr v. Liebeck, 141 Wash.
581, 252 Pac. 107 (1927); Gunderson v. Green, 154 Wash. 201, 281 Pac. 731 (1929)[see discussion under § 3-408]; Americus v. McGinnis, 128 Wash. 28, 221 Pac. 987(1924); Osner & Mehlhorn, Inc. v. Loewe, 111 Wash. 550, 191 Pac. 746 (1920)[defense not made out]; Fisk Rubber Co. v. Pinkey, 100 Wash. 220, 170 Pac. 581(1918); Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911); Huntington v. Lombard,
22 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414 (1900) ; Gordon v. Decker, 19 Wash. 188, 52 Pac. 856(1898); Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank v. Hughson & Reavis, 5 Wash. 100, 31 Pac. 423(1892) (defense not established).
183 See Barrrox, Bn.rs Awn NoTEs 121 (2d ed. 1961).
284 Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn2d 738, 306 P.2d 751 (1957) ; Fleming v. August, 48
Wn.2d 131, 291 P.2d 639 (1955), 31 WAsn:. L. Rnv. 105 (1955) ; Walker v. Copeland,
193 Wash. 1, 74 P2d 469 (1937) ; First Methodist Church v. Soden, 131 Wash. 228, 229
Pac. 534 (1924) ; Dickson v. Protzman, 123 Wash. 247, 212 Pac. 249 (1923) ; Post v.
Tamm, 91 Wash. 504, 158 Pac. 91 (1916) ; Morris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63
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conditions subsequent may not be shown by parol evidence,185 since the
language of the Code is in terms only of conditions precedent. The
fundamental difficulty remains, however, that the distinction between
the two kinds of conditions is, at most, form 8 and, at worst, a fictional
device which permit variations in decisions in order to side-step the
effect of the parol evdence rule.' There are almost certain to be
irreconcilable decisions under a rule which permits a signer of an instru-
ment showing absolute liability on its face to show that in reality he was
to become liable only on a certain event, but which precludes his show-
ing (even if such were the fact) an understanding that he was not to be
liable at all,"88 or that he was liable on a different performance.8 9
Subparagraph (d) appears to be somewhat out of place, since it states
what appear to be procedural limitations rather than substantive rights.
It seeks to limit to two situations the power, by a holder who has no
defense in his own right, to set up a third party's claim. In other words,
this means allowing an obligor to say, in effect, "I'm obligated on the
instrument, but I ought to pay X and not you." So long as the plaintiff
is the holder, the obligor must pay him whether or not some third person
has a valid claim to the instrument, unless (a) the case comes within
the two situations stated in the statute, or (b) the third person is
Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911). See also the discussion at §§ 3-119, 3-415, and Shat-
tuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part II, 34 WASH. L. Rzv. 345, 382 (1959).
18 5 Fleming v. August, supra note 184; Whitman Realty & Inv. Co. v. Day, 161
Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171 (1931) ; Post v. Tamm, supra note 184.
188 A note may be delivered to become effective only if the Dow Jones averages reach
a certain point, or it may be delivered as immediately effective, subject to being aborted
if the Dow Jones average does not reach a certain figure. Only the wording is different,
for in either situation the figure reached by the Dow Jones averages is precedent to any
obligation to perform.
18 7 In Byrne v. Sanders, 19 Wn.2d 56, 134 P.2d 941 (1943) the payee sued on a note
for $1000 face amount, but the maker was allowed to show that he had signed that note
with the understanding that the payee was to determine the actual amount of indebted-
ness due, and that the amount of liability should equal that figure and no more. Since
this indebtedness was $150, the trial judge erred in not allowing the jury to return a
verdict for that sum, according to the supreme court. This opinion cites no authority,
does not discuss the parol evidence rule, and seems to be erroneous.
188 White v. Armstrong, 166 Wash. 346, 7 P2d 12 (1932) ; First Methodist Church
v. Soden, 131 Wash. 288, 229 Pac. 534 (1924); Puget Sound Tel. Co. v. Telechro-
nometer Co., 130 Wash. 468, 227 Pac. 867 (1924) ; Moore v. Kildall, 111 Wash. 504,
191 Pac. 394 (1920) ; Natl Bank v. Becker, 74 Wash. 431, 133 Pac. 613 (1913) ; Pitt
v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910), 23 YALE L.J. 313 (1914) ; Anderson v.
Mitchell, 51 Wash. 265, 98 Pac. 751 (1908) ; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14 Wash. 129, 44 Pac.
138 (1896) ; Bryan v. Duff, 12 Wash. 233, 40 Pac. 936 (1895) ; Glenn v. Hill, 11 Wash.
541, 40 Pac. 141 (1895).
189 Blaine v. Darwin, 160 Wash. 327, 295 Pac. 131 (1931) ; Gwinn v. Ford, 85 Wash.
571, 148 Pac. 891 (1915), aff'd, 91 Wash. 498, 158 Pac. 536 (1916) ; First Nat'l Life
Ass'n Soc'y v. Farquhar, 75 Wash. 667, 135 Pac. 619 (1913).
The Code does not add to the confusion. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIA LE INSTRUMENTS
LAW 366-93 (7th ed., Beutel ed. 1948).
See also the related discussion under §§ 3-119 and 3-415.
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actually in the suit and setting up his own claim. This, then is the prob-
lem involving the availability of jus tertil defense to an obligor, and has
been artfully discussed elsewhere. 90 Unfortunately, the Washington
decisions are difficult to pinpoint on this issue, and it can only be con-
cluded that they have failed to manifest any clearcut policy. In some
instances, obligors have successfully asserted third party rights in order
to block a plaintiff's recovery.19 1 On the other hand, some decisions
have inferred that only the holder of the outstanding claim may assert
it.1"' Unlike these decisions, the Code is consistent throughout and
permits an obligor to pay the holder in performance of his contract even
with knowledge of outstanding claims, where subsection (d) precludes
his use of those claims defensively."9
Section 3-307. BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING SIGNATURES,
DEFENSES AND DUE COURSE. (1) Unless specifically denied in
the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted. When the
effectiveness of a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the
signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except
where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported
signer who has died or become incompetent before proof is
required.
10 BRTroN, BILLS AND NoTus 462-77 (2d ed. 1961).
191 Westcott v. Donion, 137 Wash. 78, 241 Pac. 658 (1925) (apparently permits a
maker to defend on the basis of the rights of a creditor of the payee where the payee
indorsed to the plaintiff in fraud of creditors); Young v. American Can Co., 131 Wash.
374, 230 Pac. 147 (1924) ; Gross v. Bennington, 52 Wash. 417, 100 Pac. 846 (1909). In
this last cited case, the defendant had executed a note payable to a railroad, which had
indorsed it over to X and eventually it was transferred to the plaintiff. There was evi-
dence of the propriety and validity of the indorsement by the railroad (payee), but the
court said that it was still possible that the maker could show that the assignment by
one of the transferors was fraudident. Under the Code, it could be shown that bearer
paper was stolen, but not that it was transferred through fraudulent inducement. Obvi-
ously, under the Code as under prior law, the victim of the fraud could assert his own
claim, and under § 3-306(a) this claim would be superior to that of a holder other than
one in due course.
192 Miller v. Williamson, 128 Wash. 124, 222 Pac. 201 (1924) (the defending maker
was not permitted to show that the payee had indorsed the instrument over to the
plaintiff wvithout authority) ; Thomson v. Koch, 62 Wash. 438, 113 Pac. 1110 (1911)
(in a suit by the transferee against the maker it constitutes no defense that the paper
was endorsed and discounted under a usurious contract at an unlawful rate of interest) ;
Lodge v. Lewis, 32 Wash. 191, 72 Pac. 1009 (1903) ; Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Emmons,
16 Wash. 585, 48 Pac. 262 (1897) ; Allen v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 13 Wash. 307,
43 Pac. 55 (1895).
193 Section 3-603. See Leary, Commercial Paper: Article III, 16 ARK. L. Rav. 33,
42 (1961).
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(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of
the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the
defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the
rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing
that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course.
The three subdivisions of this section suggest a rough outline of the
critical issues in a suit on a negotiable instrument: (1) Was the instru-
ment executed by the defendant or by another authorized by the de-
fendant? (2) Does the defendant have a sufficient reason for not pay-
ing? (3) Is that reason one which is not valid against a due course
holder, and is the plaintiff a due course holder? Although an actual law
suit may not unfold in this way,194 this order of stating the issues cor-
responds to the order in which the trier of facts will have to unravel the
case.
Subdivision (a) is new and requires a word of caution. It deals
with forged or unauthorized signatures, and the caveat is that this
issue may arise in a number of ways, only one of which seems to be
governed by this section. By way of illustration, consider those cases
in which a drawee bank has paid a check, charged the drawer's account,
and then has discovered that the drawer's signature was forged, or that
an indorsement was forged. The court action will probably be one by
the drawer to require the drawee to recredit his account for the ques-
tionable item. In such an action, which party bears the burden of
establishing the forgery?
Literally read, the Code section presently under discussion would
place the burden of establishing validity upon the drawee bank, since
the drawee bank is the party which is relying on the signature. With
one exception, 99 the Washington decisions196 and text authority 9 " have
been to the contrary under prior law. (The Code probably will not be
construed to change the rule of these decisions, because the location of
this section, coupled with the wording of the Official Comments, sug-
gests that the posture of the case is significant.) Thus, this section
191 Lynn, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 OHio ST. LJ. 219, 233(1962).
196 Crane v. Dexter Horton & Co., 5 Wash. 479, 32 Pac. 223 (1893).
196 Denbigh v. First Natl Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918) ; Buell v.
Aberdeen State Bank, 58 Wash. 407, 108 Pac. 951 (1910).
197 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1837 (1942).
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appears to apply only where a person is attempting to enforce payment,
and not where, as in the cases cited, the suit is to cancel out a payment
already made. Similarly, it seems'that this section would apply in an
action to establish liability for breach of warranty of title, in the forged
indorsement pattern. 8 In these cases, it is believed that the plaintiff
should bear the burden of showing the breach of warranty, and that this
would require him to establish the forgery.
The Washington decisions on forged or unauthorized signatures can
be characterized as contrary to the Code rule, though they have not
been overly precise. 9" They have, however, been consistent with the
underlying assumption made by the codifiers that forgeries are unusual;
indeed, they are so unusual that at least the burden of going forward
with the evidence rests on the person asserting that a forgery exists2 0
Thus these Washington decisions are harmonious with the idea that the
one claiming a forgery must, in the first instance, introduce some evi-
dence to support his contention. 0 ' The nature of the evidence required
is not specified by the Code, but it is often entirely circumstantial."'
With respect to the Codes' requirement that the pleadings must specifi-
108 Section 3-417.
'
99 For example, in Lanza v. Hillman's Estate, 194 Wash. 694, 79 P2d 643 (1938),
the findings of the trial court that a signature was authentic were sustained, even
though the evidence on the point was evenly balanced. Under the Code, it would appear
that even balance of the evidence would defeat recovery by a holder.
In National City Bank v. Shelton Elec. Co., 96 Wash. 74, 164 Pac. 933 (1917), there
is specific language that once the plaintiff showed that certain signatures were authenti-
cally those of officers of the defendant, and that the dates were such as to fall at a time
during the tenure of office of those officers, the burden of convincing the jury that the
signatures were unauthorized rested on the defendant. The Code, just as did the NIL,
provides a basis for at least part of this allocation of the burden, for under § 3-114(3)
the dates of the instrument are presumed to be correct. Thus if the defendant is
asserting that the signers were not authorized to bind it because (a) the instruments
were signed at a time other than shown by the date and (b) at a time when the signers
were not authorized, the burden of overcoming the effect of the presumption of proper
date, at least in the sense of going forward with the evidence, rests on the defendant
under § 1-201(31).
In Yakima Valley Bank v. McAllister, 37 Wash. 566, 79 Pac. 1119 (1905), however,
the rule adopted accords with the Code's rule.200 Kilbourne v. Rathbun, 91 Wash. 121, 157 Pac. 457 (1916) ; Fishburne v. Robin-
son, 49 Wash. 271, 95 Pac. 80 (1908) ; Yakima Nat'l Bank v. Knipe, 6 Wash. 348, 33
Pac. 834 (1893).
20 Once some evidence is introduced to support the claim of forgery, the presumption
of genuineness disappears. Official Comment 1. This, in general, accords with previous
authority on the effect of the NIL's presumptions. Nicholson v. Neary, 77 Wash. 294,
137 Pac. 492 (1914).2 02 In Moore v. Palmer, 14 Wash. 134, 44 Pac. 142 (1896), the plaintiff sued on a
$20,000 note and was met by the defense that the note was either a forgery or had been
obtained (from the deceased maker) by trickery. A jury verdict for the defendants was
sustained, because plaintiff was shown to have been of very limited means, to have
borrowed money from the defendant and given his note, which was inconsistent with
his claim that he held a $20,000 note bankable at any Seattle bank. On the other hand,
in Taylor v. Gale, 14 Wash. 57, 44 Pac. 110 (1896), the defendant (maker) of the notes
contended that they were forged, and sought to prove this by showing that sometime
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cally deny the signature in order to raise the forgery issue, there is no
previous Washington authority.0 3
Subsection (2) clarifies, without changing prior law, the allocation of
the burden of proof for asserted defenses. While the burden is on the
plaintiff to establish conditions precedent to the defendant's liability,
(i.e. presentment, dishonor, notice and protest)'" it is incumbent on
the defendant to convince the trier of fact that a defense exists." 5
Illustrative are Washington decisions which require that the defendant
establish want or failure of consideration,20 ' fraud,"' duress,0 ' usury,20 9
conditional delivery or liability,210 and payment.211
The Washington rule with respect to the allocation of the burden of
prior to the dates of the notes he had received a substantial inheritance. The court held
that such evidence was erroneously admitted, since men execute notes whether or not
impecunious.
In Moore v. Palmer, supra, evidence was submitted to the jury that the deceased
maker had referred to the plaintiff as a "jack-leg lawyer," because this rebuts the
plaintiff's contention that the note was given for legal services.
Usually, the evidence is more conventional, consisting of professional or lay testi-
mony about the authenticity of the specific signature. Poncin v. Furth, 15 Wash. 201,
46 Pac. 241 (1906) ; Moore v. Palmer, supra.
2
03 Cf. Tullis v. Shannon, 3 Wash. 716, 29 Pac. 449 (1892), where a general denial
was held to put the plaintiff to proof of his ownership.204 Bay View Brewing Co. v. Grubb, 24 Wash. 163, 63 Pac. 1091 (1901).
2 0 5 Metzger v. Sigall, 83 Wash. 80, 145 Pac. 72 (1914) ; Clark v. Eltinge, 34 Wash.
323, 75 Pac. 866 (1904).2 06 Delegan v. White, 59 Wn.2d 510, 368 P2d 682 (1962) ; Dittmar v. Frye, 200
Wash. 708, 93 P.2d 716 (1939) ; Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939) ;
O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P2d 641 (1933); Building Materials, Inc. v.
Electric Equip. & Eng'r Co., 166 Wash. 573, 7 P2d 601 (1932); Morisse v. Salvesen,
165 Wash. 157, 4 P.2d 252 (1931); West & Wheeler v. Longtin, 118 Wash. 575, 204
Pac. 183 (1922); Woodland State Bank v. McKean, 118 Wash. 451, 203 Pac. 939
(1922), 22 CoLum L. Rzv. 481; Spokane State Bank v. Pitner, 114 Wash. 177, 194
Pac. 969 (1921) ; State Bank v. Morrison, 85 Wash. 182, 147 Pac. 875 (1915) ; Lyts v.
Keevey, 5 Wash. 606, 32 Pac. 534 (1893); McKenzie v. Oregon Imp. Co., 5 Wash.
409, 31 Pac. 748 (1892); Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank v. Hughson & Reavis, 5 Wash.
100, 31 Pac. 423 (1892).
2
07 Olympia Credit Bureau v. Smedegard, 40 Wn.2d 76, 241 P.2d 203 (1952) ; West-
cott v. Donion, 137 Wash. 78, 241 Pac. 658 (1925). Literally read, the Code rejects the
requirement found in Washington decisions that fraud must be proved by "clear, co-
gent and convincing evidence," since the definition of "burden of establishing" is less
onerous Section 1-201(8).
208 Whitman Realty & Inv. Co. v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171 (1931) ; Corn-
wall v. Anderson, 85 Wash. 369, 148 Pac. 1 (1915). On the requirement of "clear and
satisfactory" evidence, see the preceding footnote.
209 Neeser v. Martin, 54 Wn.2d 66, 337 P.2d 1065 (1959) ; Gill v. Strouf, 5 Wn.2d
426, 105 P.2d 829 (1940); McCall v. Smith, 184 Wash. 615, 52 P.2d 338 (1935);
Arnot v. Fischer, 161 Wash. 67, 295 Pac. 1117 (1931) ; Bovee v. Yamamoto, 121 Wash.
517, 209 Pac. 697 (1922) ; Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Maple Valley Lumber Co., 77
Wash. 686, 138 Pac. 553 (1914) ; Brundage v. Burke, 11 Wash. 679, 40 Pac. 343 (1895).
210 Downie v. Cooledge, 48 Wn.2d 485, 294 P.2d 926 (1956) ; Doonan v. Rossi, 112
Wash. 150, 191 Pac. 865 (1920) ; Elwell v. Turney, 39 Wash. 615, 81 Pac. 1047 (1905).21 1 Rushlight v. McLain, 28 Wn.2d 189, 182 P.2d 62 (1947) ; Federal Rubber Co. v.
M. M. Stewart Co., 180 Wash. 625, 41 P.2d 158 (1935) ; Creditors Ass'n v. Fry, 179
Wash. 339, 37 P.2d 688 (1934) ; Thorpe v. Hovick, 134 Wash. 249, 235 Pac. 14 (1925);
Blaser v. Meeker, 125 Wash. 379, 216 Pac. 1 (1923).
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proof on the issues of authority vel non to bind the defendant has been
stated as follows:
Where agency is denied altogether, the burden is upon the party alleging
agency to prove it; but where... an agency to deal with the particular
subject of the inquiry is alleged or admitted, and a special limitation is
relied upon to avoid liability for certain of the agent's acts concerning the
matters with which he is authorized to deal, the burden is upon the party
asserting the special limitation to prove it.212
The defenses of improper completion and alteration are treated as
aspects of one generic defense under the Code. 1 In Ladd & Tilton
Bank v. Small,"' the defendant had signed checks in blank and placed
them in another's hands, and it was held that, under NIL section 59,
the defendant had become bound on the instrument prior to the acqui-
sition of defective title. It was therefore not incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove that he was a due course holder. This analysis seems
incorrect, since the initial obligation on the instrument arose on comple-
tion and not before. Thus, if defendant were to show a lack of
authority to complete the instrument, recovery would be precluded
unless the plaintiff is able to show that he holds in due course.
As a matter of first impression, one would assume that the burden of
proof to show alteration on an instrument should be upon the defendant,
and some of the early decisions have so held."1 There is doubt whether
this is true in every case,"1 ' and even greater doubt where the alteration
is obvious." The Washington rule, when an alteration is obvious,
requires the plaintiff to prove that no alteration had occurred.1 While
the probable impact of the Code will be to change this rule,19 no pre-
diction is entirely safe.220
Subsection (3) covers the burden of proof on the issue of due course
holding. However, before an analysis is undertaken, it must be ob-
served that demonstrating the validity of all necessary signatures may
not establish the plaintiff as the holder of the instrument. Suppose, by
212 Mott Iron Works v. Metropolitan Bank, 78 Wash. 294, 139 Pac. 36 (1914);
accord: McKinley v. Mineral Hill Consol. Mining Co., 46 Wash. 162, 89 Pac. 495.
(1907) ; Stinson v. Sachs, 8 Wash. 391, 36 Pac. 287 (1894).213 See § 3-407.
214126 Wash. 8, 216 Pac. 862 (1923).215 Yakima Nat'l Bank v. Knipe, 6 Wash. 348, 33 Pac. 834 (1893) ; Wolferman v.
Bell, 6 Wash. 84, 33 Pac. 834 (1893).2 16 BRITrox, Bu, s AND Noras § 287 (2d ed. 1961).
21" BRADY, BANIK CHEcKs 442 (3rd ed. 1962).278 Lembo v. Federici, 62 Wn2d 972, 385 P.2d 312 (1963), 39 WAsH. L. REV. 228
(1964).
219 BRADY, op. cit. supra note 217.220 See discussion in 39 WAsH. L. REv. 228 (1964).
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way of illustration, that an instrument is payable on its face to the order
of A, and A has indorsed "Pay to B." The signatures of the maker and
of A are valid, but if the instrument is in the hands of C, there is techni-
cafly no holder, as defined by the Code. 2 ' At this point, if C is to be
able to recover on the instrument, he must establish additional facts
that explain why he is the one to be paid.22 An illustrative case under
prior law is Stinson v. Sacks."' Here the maker contended that the
plaintiff was not the indorsee or payee (or bearer of bearer paper),
rather the actual payee was an agent of plaintiff. If this were true, the
principal could sue on the instrument, though it was payable to the
agent, without an indorsement from the agent, since the principal is the
owner of the document. The Code would be to the same effect.
Once it is shown that the plaintiff should be able to recover as a
holder, or as one having the holder's rights, and the defendant has
shown a personal defense, the issue of due course holding becomes
critical. On this issue, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff under
both the Code and prior law. 24 However, the Code clarifies some points
which were previously uncertain. First, the proof of any defense places
the proof of due course holding upon the plaintiff;225 Second, this bur-
den requires that the plaintiff establish all the elements of due course
holding.2 These requirements place a rather ticklish burden on the
221 " 'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an in-
strument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or
to bearer or in blank." Section 1-201 (20).
Under this definition, B, the special indorsee, and A, the payee, are not holders,
since they are not in possession. C, who is in possession, is not the holder because the
instrument is not payable to him, to his order, or to bearer.
222 Official Comment 2.
223 8 Wash. 391, 36 Pac. 287 (1894).
224 RCW 62.01.059 [NIL § 59].
225 Decisions under prior law were uncertain where the defense asserted was want or
failure of consideration. There is authority in Washington that proof of these defenses
will require plaintiff, if he is to recover, to carry the burden of proof on the issue of due
course holding. Great W. Land & Improvement Co. v. Sandygren, 141 Wash. 451, 252
Pac. 123 (1927) (dissenting opinion) ; National City Bank v. Shelton Elec. Co., 96
Wash. 74, 164 Pac. 933 (1917). Other authority is that in such instances, the defendant,
even though he has shown his defense of lack or failure of consideration, still must pay,
unless he further shows that the plaintiff is not one having the rights of an holder in due
course. First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 148 Fed. 953, (9th Cir. 1906); Stevens v. Sel-
vidge, 103 Wash. 683, 175 Pac. 294 (1918); German-American Bank v. Wright, 85
Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769 (1915) ; Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 193 (1911).
226 There is no doubt, except for exceptions stated in the previous footnote, that the
plaintiff must establish his due course holding. Nissen v. Obde, 55 Wn2d 527, 348
P.2d 421 (1960) ; Bowles v. Billik, 27 Wn,2d 629, 178 P.2d 954 (1947), 23 WAsH. L.
REv. 74 (1948); Higgins v. Radach, 12 Wn.2d 628, 123 P.2d 352 (1942); Spokane
Sec. Fin. Co. v. DeLano, 168 Wash. 546, 12 P.2d 924 (1932) ; Gottstein v. Simmons,
59 Wash. 178, 109 Pac. 596 (1910) ; City Nat'l Bank v. Mason, 58 Wash. 492, 108
Pac. 1071 (1910); Cedar Rapids Nat'l Bank v. Myhre Bros., 57 Wash. 596, 107 Pac.
518 (1910). But there is doubt as to whether all of the elements must be shown. The
Code seems to settle this question by its precise wording in a way rejecting those de-
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plaintiff, since he is often required to prove a negative-i.e. that he did
not take in bad faith. Since testimonials on this issue by the plaintiff
or his agent are often pious sounding, there is substantial doubt as to
whether these self-serving bits of testimony must be accepted as true if
uncontradicted.2  Some authority exists in Washington which darkly
hints that the testimony of partisans is more likely false than true." 8
An appropriate rule would seem to be that credibility of witnesses,
however prejudiced, is for jury determination 29 Where unchallenged
nonpartisan testimony exists to the effect that a plaintiff is a due course
holder, a directed verdict for the plaintiff is even warranted."' 0
cisions to the effect that once the plaintiff shows that he took for value and in ordinary
course of events, the burden is then upon the defendant to show bad faith. Lovering v.
Pacific Fruit Package Co., 162 Wash. 445, 298 Pac. 693 (1931); Fisk Rubber Co. v.
Pinkey, 100 Wash. 220, 170 Pac. 581 (1918). Washington decisional authority consistent
with the Code, however, is not lacking. Ireland v. Scharpenberg, 54 Wash. 558, 103
Pac. 801 (1909).227 BproiN, BmLs AmW NoTas § 105 (2d ed. 1961).2 28 Gosline v. Dryfoos, 45 Wash. 396, 88 Pac. 634 (1907).229 Yakima Valley Bank v. Churchill, 131 Wash. 45, 228 Pac. 1009 (1924) ; National
Fin. Co. v. Emerson, 117 Wash. 297, 201 Pac. 4 (1921) ; Washington Trust Co. v.
Keyes, 88 Wash. 287, 152 Pac. 1029 (1915); American Say. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911), aff'd, 67 Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26 (1912);
Scandinavian Am. Bank v. Johnston, 63 Wash. 187, 115 Pac. 102 (1911).
220 Angus v. Downs, 85 Wash. 75, 147 Pac. 630 (1915) ; McLaughlin v. Dopps, 84
Wash. 442, 147 Pac. 6 (1915). Conversely, the plaintiffs evidence may be insufficient as
a matter of law. Gunderson v. Green, 154 Wash. 201, 281 Pac. 731 (1929).
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